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INTRODUcTION

Collective bargaining is truly a part of the American labor fabric. The serious practitioner knows the current parameters and
direction of private sector collective bargaining. The same, however,
cannot be said of public sector collective bargaining. The National
Labor Relations Act (hereafter NLRA),' enacted in 1935, provides
for private sector collective bargaining. However, public sector employees (that is, employees of the federal, state, and local governments) continue to be specifically exempt from NLRA coverage.'
Congressional interest in providing state and local government employees with collective bargaining processes similar to that accorded
private sector employees has failed to gain sufficient support.3 As a
consequence, state and local employees have had to look to state
and local governments for collective bargaining protections, and
such legislative recognition is of recent origin. 4
Unlike the federal scheme, state and local collective bargaining
statutes are far from uniform in their provision for collective bargaining rights and duties. The protections afforded and rights and
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
3. This legislation is basically of two types. The first merely removes the current public
employee exemptions from the Federal act. The second is a comprehensive statute patterned
after the Federal act. Even if Congress considered enacting such legislation, its constitutionality has been recently brought into question by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 852 (1976). Here the court declared that Congress did not have the authority under the
Commerce Clause to extend minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976), to municipal and state employees. The court held the
authority of states to regulate wage hour decisions of its state and local employees was
protected under the Tenth Amendment. See Sachs, FederalRegulations of the Public Sector:
Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, LABOR RELATiONS LAW IN THE Puauc
SECTOR (ABA Section of Labor Relations Law 1977).
4. Prior to 1959, there were few court decisions and no legislation authorizing public
employee collective bargaining. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1142 (1953 and Supp. 1978); Petro,
Sovereignty and Compulsory Public-Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE FoREsT L. Rv. 25, 37
(1974). In 1959, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the first public employee collective bargaining legislation. (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70, 111.71 (West 1974)).
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duties conferred differ from state to state,' and frequently the statutes within a given state provide dissimilar treatment for various
classes of public employees.' Public sector collective bargaining
applicable to state and local public employees is a developing area
of law dependent upon diverse state statutes. Consequently, it is
difficult to discuss the collective bargaining process applicable to
state and local employees except in relation to the legislation of a
particular state.
The topic this article presents is the method of determining the
appropriate scope of public sector collective bargaining. The suggested approach is based on Montana's situation; however, because
of the universal nature of the problem it should be of assistance to
other jurisdictions. This discussion is divided into three major categories: general background and legislation (section H); the appropriate scope of public sector bargaining (section III); and application
of the developed method (section IV). Section IV applies the developed method to topics arising in contract negotiations between primary and secondary teachers and school boards. While the method
can be applied to all public employment categories, primary and
secondary education was chosen because it is the employment area
that is subject to the most litigation and turmoil. It thus should
define most effectively the appropriate scope of collective bargaining,' and definitive assistance in this area is imperative.
II.

GENERAL BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATION

The vast majority of states have enacted some form of public
employee collective bargaining legislation.' Most often this legislation, like its private sector counterpart, requires the public employer to negotiate with the employee bargaining representative on
certain subjects However, unlike private sector collective bargain5. B. WERNE, Punuc EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS [hereinafter cited as WERNE] 135-43
(1974).
6. The various classes of public employees (such as police, firefighters, and teachers)
may be afforded different collective bargaining rights under the law. See WERNE, supra note
5, at 135-41. See also West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 578-79, 295
A.2d 526, 533-34 (1972), where the court notes that the obligation for public employers to
bargain with teachers and municipal employees is different.
7. See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 243 (1978). (Note the number of cases that involve
public schools.) See also Comment, State Court Interpretationof Teacher Collective Bargaining: Four Approaches to the Scope of Bargaining Issues, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 421 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Four Approaches]; note 144, infra.
8. WEME, supra note 5, at 136.
9. State acts can be divided into two categories-those that require the parties to
merely "meet and confer," and those that require "negotiations." Under the "meet and
confer" approach the outcome of public employee-employer discussions depends more on
management's determinations than on bilateral decisions by equals. Statutes that embody
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ing, there is significant uncertainty regarding the scope of these
required subjects. Because public sector collective bargaining is relatively new, has few judicial guidelines, and negotiating parties are
often inexperienced, a great deal of collective bargaining time is
devoted to determining which topics are open to negotiation. Public
sector collective bargaining often becomes bogged down, not on the
substantive problem of determining what provisions are to be included in any agreement, but on the procedural problem of determining which potential bargaining topics are subject to required
negotiation. The inability of the parties to determine whether a
certain employee bargaining proposal is subject to mandatory negotiation often results in the breakdown of the bargaining process.
The collapse of the bargaining process sets the stage for the use
of employee economic weapons, such as strikes, slow downs, and
sick outs. Unlike the situation in most states, 0 public employee
strikes are not unlawful in Montana." Whether legal or illegal, public employees' use of economic weapons is widespread, and where
vital public services are affected, these activities have a crippling
effect. The purpose of public employee collective bargaining is to
avoid this strife by providing a method for the employer and the
employees constructively to work out their differences. Where the
collective bargaining process breaks down because the parties are
unable to define which topics are subject to negotiation, the fault
for the breakdown lies with the process, and not necessarily with the
parties.
Unlike the situation in the private sector, the courts have had
difficulty in defining the appropriate scope of public sector collective bargaining. This difficulty is evidenced by the number of practitioners and scholars who have directed their energies toward this
subject, the struggle the courts have had with developing an appropriate definition, and the divergence of opinions both groups have
reached. 13 An appreciation of the problem and any analysis of the
that "negotiations" approach tend to treat both parties at the bargaining table as equals and
comtemplate that decisions on contract terms will be bilateral. SHAW, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS IN PUBLIC WORKERS AND PUBLIC UNIONS 23-25 (1972). This article will
be concerned only with legislation that requires "negotiations."
10. WERNE, supra note 5, at 186-90.
11. State Dept. of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 354,
529 P.2d 785, 787-88 (1974).
12. The Montana Act for collective bargaining for public employees provides: "to promote public business by removing certain recognized sources of strife and unrest, it is the
policy of the State of Montana to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment of all disputes between public employers and their
employees." MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 39-31-101 (1978) (formerly codified at REvISE CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 19471, §
59-1601 (Supp. 1977)).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol40/iss2/2
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situation in Montana must begin with the appropriate Montana
legislative provisions.
A.

Background of Public Sector Collective
Bargaining Legislation in Montana

The Montana public employees collective bargaining act'4
(hereafter Montana Act) applies to all Montana state and local
nonmanagement public employees, except registered nurses in
public health care facilities, and professional engineers and engineers in training.15
following articles: Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for Bargainingin Local Government Labor
Relations, 30 MD. L. REv. 179 (1970); Moskow, The Scope of Collective Bargainingin Higher
Education, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 33; Comment, The Civil Service-Collective BargainingConflict
in the Public Sector: Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 826 (1971); Blair, State
Legislative Control Over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective Bargainingfor State and MunicipalEmployees, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1973); Edwards, The
Emerging Duty To Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 885 (1973); Summers,
Public Employee Bargaining:A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); Comment,
Collective Bargaining in the FederalService: The Permissible Scope of Negotiations under
Executive Order 11491, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 193 (1974); Comment, Defining the Scope
of Grievance Arbitrationin Public EducationEmployment Contracts,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 814
(1974); Comment, Determining the Scope of Bargainingunder the Indiana Education Employment Relations Act, 49 IND. L.J. 460 (1974); Comment, Public Sector Grievance Procedure, Due Process and the Duty of FairRepresentation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1976); R. T.
Clark, The Scope of the Duty to Bargain in Public Employment, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR (ABA Section of Labor Relations Law 1977) [hereinafter cited as Clark];
Alleyne, Statutory Restraints on the BargainingObligation in Public Employment, LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (ABA Section of Labor Relations Law 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Alleyne]; Wollett, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector-A Spherical
Perspective, Report of Seminar on Public Employee Labor Relations (Univ. of Kentucky
College of Law 1977); Weisberger, The AppropriateScope of Bargainingin the Public Sector:
The Continuing Controversy and the Wisconsin Experience, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 685 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Weisberger]; Four Approaches, supra note 7; Comment, The Scope of
Negotiations under the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, 63 IowA L. REV. 649 (1978).
Sackman, Redefining the Scope of Bargainingin PublicEmployment, 19 BOSTON C. L. REV.
155 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Sackman].
14. MCA §§ 39-32-101 to 111 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 41-2201 to
2209 (Supp. 1977)). In 1968, the Montana Legislature enacted the Nurses' Employment
Practices Act (MCA §§ 39-32-101 to 111 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 41-2201
to 2209 (Supp. 1977))), which provided collective bargaining for registered and licensed practical nurses in all health care facilities, whether publicly or privately owned. MCA § 39-32102 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 41-2202 (1), (2), (3), and (5) (Supp. 1977)).
In 1971, the Montana legislature enacted the Professional Negotiation Act for teachers, which
required school boards to "bargain" on certain subjects and "meet and confer" on other
subjects. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 75-6115 to 6128 (repealed 1975). Finally, in 1973, the legislature
adopted the act for public employee collective bargaining, the first comprehensive collective
bargaining legislation. MCA §§ 39-31-101 to 409 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947,
§ § 59-1601 to 1617 (Supp. 1977)). Originally, the statute applied to non-management employees of the state and any political subdivision, except teachers and nurses who continue to be
covered under separate legislation. In 1975, the Montana legislature repealed the separate
legislation for teachers and brought them within the comprehensive act. Ch. 117, Laws of
Montana (1975).
MCA §§ 39-31-101
to 409 (1978)
(formerly codified
Published15.
by ScholarWorks
at University
of Montana,
1979 at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1602(2)
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The Montana Act is patterned after the NLRA. In addition to
providing collective bargaining, it grants other employee protections.' 6 The Act is administered by a five-member Board of Personnel Appeals, 7 which in most respects corresponds to the National
Labor Relations Board."
B.

The Montana Act Provisions on the Scope
of Collective Bargaining

Under the Montana Act, public employees have the right to
"bargain collectively through representatives of-their own choosing
on questions of wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions
of employment . . . ."" The public employer and the employee

bargaining representative are required to "meet at reasonable times
and negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, fringe
benefits, and other conditions of employment,. . . and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached."20
However, the obligation to bargain in good faith does not compel
either party to agree or make concessions. 2'
In this respect, the Montana Act conforms to the bargaining
obligations set forth in the NLRA and most other state public employee bargaining statutes. 22 Under the NLRA, the parties are required to bargain in good faith on "wages, hours, and terms and
other conditions of employment .... "23 Unlike the Montana Act,
the NLRA does not specifically require good faith bargaining on
"fringe benefits," but the federal act has been long construed to
include fringe benefits within wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment. 2 While the collective bargaining legislation in some
(Supp. 1977)).
16. For a more complete discussion of the Montana act, see Loring, Labor Relations
Law in Montana, 39 MONT. L. Rav. 33 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Loring]; Comment,
Negotiating with the Public: Montana's Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act, 36
MONT. L. REV. 80 (1975).
17. MCA §§ 39-31-202, 207, 208, 209, 210, and 403-09 (1978) (formerly codified at
R.C.M. 1947, §§ 59-1606 to 1608 (Supp. 1977)).
18. Compare MCA §§ 39-31-202, 207, 208, 209, 210 and 403-09 (1978) (formerly codified
at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 59-1606 to 1608 (Supp. 1977)) with National Labor Relations Act
[hereinafter cited as NLRA] §§ 9-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160-61 (1976).
19. MCA § 39-31-305(2) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1605(3) (Supp.
1977)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Compare MCA § 39-31-305(2) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 591605(3) (Supp. 1977)) with 29 U.S.C. § 138(d) (1976).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
24. See C. J. MORRIS, DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOND, THE COURTS AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS AcT [hereinafter cited as DEV. LAB. LAW 387-406 (1971); R. GORMAN, LABOR
LAW [hereinafted cited as GORMAN] 498-506 (1976).
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states may not require bargaining on the four categories set forth in
the Montana Act (wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment), the bargaining obligation is frequently so
defined. 5
Unlike the NLRA and most state public employee acts, the
Montana Act specifically provides that the public employer's bargaining obligation is narrowed by the fact that the bargaining representative of the public employee shall recognize the "prerogatives
of public employers to operate and manage their affairs in such
areas as, but not limited to:
(1) direct employees;
(2) hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees;
(3) relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or funds
or under conditions where continuation of such work would be
inefficient and nonproductive;
(4) maintain the efficiency of government operation;
(5) determine the methods, means, job classifications, and personnel by which government operations are to be conducted;
(7) establish the methods and processes by which work is to be
performed.26
C. Interpretationof the Montana Act
When legislation has been patterned after federal private sector
legislation, state Public Employee Relations Boards (hereafter
PERBs) and courts frequently look to the construction of the federal
act for guidance in the interpretation of their state act.27
Under the NLRA, the initial step in any discussion on the scope
of collective bargaining is to recognize that any given bargaining
topic will ultimately be categorized as mandatory, permissive, or
illegal and prohibited. Although the federal act does not specifically
recognize this trichotomy, the National Labor Relations Board, with
judicial approval, has long done S0.2 As a result, every topic of
bargaining in the private sector is either a subject on which bargaining is mandatory, permissive, or illegal and thus prohibited. Mandatory subjects are those which either party must negotiate in good
25. WERNE, supra note 5, at 247. See State of New Jersey v. Supervisory Employees
Ass'n, N.J. -,
-,
393 A.2d 233, 246-47 (1978), where the court notes that fringe
benefits is a mandatory subject.
26. MCA § 39-31-303 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(2) (Supp.
1977)) (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 61 Mich. App. 487, 490, 233
N.W.2d 49, 51 (1975). See note 41, infra.
28. See NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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faith to impasse9 upon the demand of the other. Permissive subjects
are those on which the parties may bargain, but neither party is
required to do so. The parties are precluded from bargaining on any
illegal topic, and any agreement reached on such a topic is void.'"
Failure to bargain on a mandatory subject upon the demand of
the other is an unfair labor practice and will result in a bargaining
order. Either party may insist to impasse on any mandatory subject
and any unilateral action taken by the employer prior to a bargaining impasse may result in an order requiring the employer to discontinue the unilateral activity and restore the status quo. Because
neither party is compelled to bargain on a permissive subject, insistence to impasse on those subjects is an unfair labor practice. However, an agreement reached on a permissive subject is valid and
3
enforceable. '
When the state legislature has adopted bargaining duty language similar to that of the NLRA, and state PERBs and courts are
required to determine whether a specific bargaining subject is
within the legislated scope of negotiations, they often follow the
federal lead and adopt the mandatory-permissive-prohibited trichotomy.32 The Montana Board of Personnel Appeals has done so.23
This approach is appropriate where the state-legislated bargaining
duty is identical or closely similar to the federal act, and the trichotomy conforms to the unique characteristics of public sector collective bargaining. However, where the state legislature has adopted
bargaining duty language different from the NLRA and the trichotomy does not conform to public sector collective bargaining, it has
been recognized that even this initial step in defining the scope of
3
public sector negotiations should not follow the federal standard. 1
Assuming for the moment that the trichotomy is appropriate under
the Montana Act, the critical question is what criteria the Board of
Personnel Appeals and the courts should apply to determine
whether a topic is mandatory, permissive, or prohibited. The federal
method provides the necessary background for consideration of this
subject.
The NLRA requires the employer to bargain with the employee
29.

Impasse refers to the inability of the parties to agree on a particular topic of bargain-

ing.
30.

See GORMAN, supra note 24, at 496-98; Dav. LAB. LAW, supra note 24, at 382-88.
See DEV. LAB. LAW, supra note 24, at 382-88; GORMAN, supra note 24, at 496-98.
32. See, e.g., Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, __
Or. App.
547 P.2d 647, 648-49 (1976); Beloit Educ. Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Rel.
Comm., 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1976).
33. See, e.g., Florence-Carlton Unit of Montana Education Ass'n v. Florence-Carlton
School Dist., B.P.A. U.L.P. no. 5-77 (1978).
34. See section III(C)(1), infra.

31.
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bargaining representative on "wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment." Bargaining topics categorized as wages, hours, or
other conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Prohibited topics of bargaining involve subjects which are illegal under the NLRA, inconsistent with the policies of the act, or
violate some other provision of law. In most instances the prohibited
topics represent a narrow category of subjects in which neither party
has significant interest. Thus, as a practical matter, most nonmandatory topics of bargaining are permissive. Consequently, the
issue is whether a given topic is mandatory or permissive. This has
not presented a significant problem under the federal act, because
mandatory subjects of bargaining have been broadly defined."
The mandatory subject categories of "wages" and "hours" have
been broadly defined under the federal act. "Wages" has been construed to include almost every conceivable bargaining issue that
concerns rates of pay and fringe benefits such as bonuses, pensions,
wage increases, and profit sharing.36 "Hours" has been given an
equally broad construction to include the particular hours of the day
and the days of the week that employees are required to work."
Thus, with the exception of retired employees, defining "wages"
and "hours" has provided few problems. Difficulty has been encountered in determining the limits of "other terms and conditions
of employment." It has been recognized that the topic must relate
to some aspect of the relationship between the employer and the
employees,3 but not concern "managerial decisions which lie at the
core of entrepreneurial control. 3' 9 It is also recognized that fre35. DEv. LA. LAw, supra note 24, at 389-439; GORMAN, supra note 24, at 496-531.
36. DEv. LAB. LAw, supra note 24, at 390-403; GORMAN, supra note 24, at 498-502.
37. DEV. LAB. LAw, supra note 24, at 403-04; GORMAN, supra note 24, at 502-06.
38. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Division, Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 350 (1958),
where the Court indicated that bargaining topics that regulate the relationship between the
employee and the union are not mandatory. In this instance the topic would have required
the union to submit the employer's last offer to the employees. The Court recognized that
mandatory bargaining was limited to proposals that regulate the relationship between the
employer and the employees.
It has also been recognized that many topics that primarily concern the relationship
between the employer and the union are mandatory subjects of bargaining. See, e.g., United
States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1962) (duration of contract);
NLRB v. Proof Co., 242 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1957) (union's right to use company bulletin
boards); NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1949) (union security provisions); Dolly Madison Industries, 182 N.L.R.B. 1037, 74 L.R.R.M. 1230 (1970) (most favored
nation clause); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953) (dues checkofi).
See also NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated 379 U.S. 644
(1965), and NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1965).
More recently the Board has adopted this position. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 150
N.L.R.B. 1574, 59 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1965); U.A.W. Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396 (1972).
39. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (Stewart, J., con-
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quently a topic will concern both legitimate employee interests and
managerial decisions. In such a situation the topic is nonmandatory only if it concerns a fundamental managerial decision.
The determination of fundamental managerial decisions has caused
the courts and the Board difficulty. 0
Because the bargaining language of public employee collective
bargaining legislation closely parallels that of the NLRA, PERBs
and state courts frequently look at the federal act to see how similar
problems have been resolved in the private sector.4 However, because of the unique characteristics of public sector collective bargaining, blind reliance on the federal act for guidance in determining the scope of public sector collective bargaining is inappropriate.
Any determination of the appropriate scope of collective bargaining
in the public sector must recognize the fundamental difference between the private and public sectors and the impact collective bargaining has on the respective decision-making processes. Before discussing this crucial topic, it is important to establish certain fundacurring). The Court held that an employer proposal to contract out work previously performed
by company employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Justice Stewart stated in a
concurring opinion:
While employment security has thus properly been recognized in various circumstances as a condition of employment, it surely does not follow that every decision
which may affect job security is a subject of compulsory collective bargaining ....
. . [T]here
[
are . . . areas where decisions by management may quite clearly
imperil job security, or indeed terminate employment entirely. An enterprise may
decide to invest in labor-saving machinery. Another may resolve to liquidate its
assets and go out of business. Nothing the court holds today should be understood
as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions,
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision
may be necessarily to terminate employment . . . . [Tihose management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or
which impinge only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded from
that area.
Id. at 223. The court later referred to the Stewart opinion with approval in Allied Chemical
& Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971).
40. Id.
41. In Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 617, 526 P.2d
971, 977 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 513 (1974), the California Supreme Court held "that the bargaining requirements of the National Labor Relations Board in cases interpreting the many
proposals be referred to for such enlightenment as they may render in our interpretation of
the scope of bargaining under the Vallejo charter." The court then determined that a series
of proposals were mandatory, relying almost entirely on NLRB precedent.
In Kerrigan v. City of Boston, 36 Mass. 24, 27, 278 N.E.2d 387, 390 (1972) the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated the scope of bargaining the under the Massachusetts act
must be given the "adjudged construction" given under the federal act. Similarly, the Michigan court observed there is "no reason to deviate from this well-reasoned and long established
federal precedent in interpreting [the Michigan Act]." Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City
of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 63-64, 214 N.W.2d 803, 813.(1974).
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mentals necessary in the development of the appropriate scope of
public sector bargaining.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE
OF PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING

Statutory authority for defining the scope of collective bargaining in the public sector arises in two ways. In states that have
borrowed language from the federal act and require bargaining on
subject matter areas similar to "wages, hours, and other conditions
of employment," the determination of the scope of bargaining depends, as under the federal act, primarily upon the construction of
the terms "wages," "hours," and "other conditions of employment." Like the federal act, there is no specific mention of employer
prerogatives, which thus must be implied. 2 In accordance with the
construction of the federal act, PERBs and courts in these states
recognize that if a subject represents an employer prerogative it is
non-mandatory. 43
Other state legislatures have further defined the scope of collective bargaining. These states, in addition to establishing a statutory
duty section requiring negotiation on "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment,"" have adopted statutory employer rights
42. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(15) (1975).
43. See, e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Decourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 580, 295 A.2d 526,
533-34 (1972).
44. Not all states use the phrase "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment."
In the Connecticut Teachers Negotiation Act, the legislature required bargaining on only
"salaries and other conditions of employment." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-1536(c) (1979). NEv.
REv.

§ 288.150(2) (1970) limits mandatory bargaining to:
(a) Salary or wage rates or other forms of direct monetary compensation.
(b) Sick leave.
(c) Vacation leave.
(d) Holidays.
(e) Other paid or unpaid leaves of absence.
(f) Insurance benefits.
(g) Total hours of work required of an employee on each work day or work week.
(h) Total number of days' work required of an employee in a work year.
(i) Discharge and disciplinary procedures.
(j) Recognition clause.
(k) The method used to classify employees in the bargaining unit.
(1) Deduction of dues for the recognized employee organization.
(m) Protection of employees in the bargaining unit from discrimination because of participation in recognized employee orgainizations consistent with the
provisions of this chapter.
(n) No-strike provisions consistent with the provisions of this chapter.
(o) Grievance and arbitration procedures for resolution of diputes relating to
interpretation or application of collective agreements.
(p) General savings clauses.
(q) Duration of collective bargaining agreements.
(r) Safety.
STAT.
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provisions which recognize certain non-mandatory employer prerogatives. Statutory recognition of employer prerogatives is often the
single most important distinction between public and private sector
collective bargaining legislation. In some states the legislation
merely recognizes the area of employer prerogatives,45 whereas in
other states the legislation identifies specific subjects which are
employer prerogatives." Some states go even further and indicate
that employer prerogatives are not limited to those specified. The
Montana Act is in this last category.4 8 It provides that bargaining
must occur on "wages, hours, fringe benefits and other conditions
of employment," but recognizes the prerogative of the employer on
certain specified topics and indicates the prerogatives are not limited to the topics specified. 9
Whether the concept of management prerogatives is an implicit
limitation on "wages, hours, fringe benefits and other conditions of
employment," or specifically recognized by statute and broadly defined, state PERBs and courts share a common problem in reconciling the mandatory duty to bargain on "wages, hours, fringe benefits
and other conditions of employment" with non-mandatory management prerogatives. It is universally recognized that there is an illu-

45.
526, 531
784, 199
46.
tives:

(s) Teacher preparation time.
(t) Procedures for reduction in work force.
See, e.g., West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 573-74, 295 A.2d
(1972); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772,
N.W.2d 752, 759 (1972).
NEv. REV. STAT. § 288.150(3) (1975) provides an extensive list of employer preroga-

Those subject matters which are not within the scope of mandatory bargaining
and which are reserved to the local government employer without negotiation include:
(a) The right to hire, direct, assign, or transfer an employee, but excluding the
right to assign or transfer an employee as a form of discipline.
(b) The right to reduce in force or lay off any employee because of lack of work
or lack of funds, subject to paragraph (t) of subsection 2.
(c) The right to determine:
(1) Appropriate staffing levels and work performance standards except for
safety considerations;
(2) The content of the workday, including without limitation workload factors,
except for safety considerations;
(3) The quality and quantity of services to be offered to the public; and
(4) The means and methods of offering those services.
47. For example, the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act provides that
"[plublic employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent managerial
policy which shall include, but shall not be limited to such areas of discretion or policy as
the functions and programs of the public employer, standards of services, its overall budget,
utilization of technology, the organizational structure and selection and direction of personnel." (Emphasis added.) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
48. See section II(B), supra.
49. MCA §§ 39-31-201 and 303 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(1)
and (2) (Supp. 1977)).
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sive line between mandatory subjects of bargaining and nonmandatory employer rights, 5 with the employees seeking a broad
interpretation of mandatory subjects and the employer seeking a
narrow construction. PERBs and courts generally recognize that a
bargaining topic may touch upon both "wages, hours, fringe benefits and other conditions of employment" and "employer prerogatives."'" However, because a topic cannot be both mandatory and
non-mandatory, this-potential conflict must be resolved. It has been
extremely difficult for both PERBs and courts to draw an acceptable line between these two categories.
An overly broad construction of the mandatory subjects adversely affects the public enterprise, and an overly broad construction of employer prerogatives cirtually cancels the bargaining
obligation. It would be extremely easy for "wages, hours, fringe
benefits, and other conditions of employment" virtually to swallow
management prerogatives, or vice versa. 5 To ensure the stability
and vitality of both the collective bargaining process and the public
enterprise, a fair and accurate method must be devised to distinguish between "wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions
of employment" and "employer prerogatives." Before attempting
50. See, e.g., Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 25, 311 A.2d
737, 741 (1973). The Oregon court recognized that "nearly everything that goes on in the
schools affects teachers and [is] therefore arguably a 'condition of employment,' " and
"many of the matters which have a substantial effect on teachers contain a measure
of
educational policy." Springfield Educ. Ass'n v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, - Or. Ap.
547 P.2d 647, 650 (1976). As one Maine judge noted, "Educational policies" and
"working conditions" may be reasonably conceived as categories defining areas with essential
purity at the extremities but with intermediate zones of substantial intermixture. Biddeford
Bd. of Educ. v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387, 413 (Me. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
See also West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 581, 295 A.2d 526, 534 (1972)
("Many educational policy decisions make an impact on a teacher's conditions of employment and the reverse is equally true. There is no unwaivering line separating the two categories.") and Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 615, 526 P.2d
971, 9.76, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (1974).
51. Red Bank Bd. of Educ. v. Washington, 138 N.J. Super. 564, 573, 351 A.2d 778, 783
(1976) (citing Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. A~s'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737
(1973)); Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. Mars Area School Dist., Pa. -. -. 389 A.2d 1073,
1075 (1978) (citing Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist. 461 Pa. 494, 507,
337 A.2d 262, 268 (1975)).
52. Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 615, 526 P.2d 971,
976, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512 (1974). See Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. V. State College Area School Dist.,
461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262, 267 (1975). As one author has noted:
A problem with both management rights and statutory preemption provisions is
that both are susceptible of (1) a literal interpretation that virtually cancels out the
bargaining-obligation language "wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment"; (2) a nonliteral interpretation that reconciles the apparent conflict with
bargaining-obligation language by giving the management rights and statutory
preemption provisions an interpretation that virtually repeals them. It seems impossible to find a middle ground.
Alleyne, supra note 13, at 106.
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to draw the line between these two general subject categories, each
must be defined.
A.

Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining

The mandatory subjects are "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment" or some similar grouping of subjects. 3 The
Montana Act adds "fringe benefits" to the list. Of these four categories, "wages," "hours," and "fringe benefits" have given the courts
little difficulty."'
1.

Wages, Hours, and Fringe Benefits

The term "wages" has been broadly defined to include almost
any conceivable method of compensation for direct wages, salaries, 55
overtime, and extra duty pay,5" to the more indirect methods of
compensation including vacation and holiday pay,5" retroactive
pay, 58 longevity increments, 5 and severance pay. 0 While the term
"hours" has caused more difficulty, it is recognized that public
employees are entitled to bargain over the amount of time they are
required to work,6" over their workload, 2 and conversely, over the
frequency and amount of work not required.63 The scheduling of
employee work time has received varying treatment.'
53. But see note 44, supra.
54. See West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 577-79, 295 A.2d 526,
533-34 (1972).
55. See generally State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Rel. Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct.
229, 306 A.2d 404 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
56. York v. Reihart, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 36, 365 A.2d 693 (1976); Bridgeton Education
Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 132 N.J. Super. 554, 334 A.2d 376 (1975).
57. Taureck v. Jersey City, 149 N.J. Super. 503, 374 A.2d 70 (1977).
58. Id; San Joaquin County Employee Ass'n v. San Joaquin, 44 Cal. App. 3d 232, 118
Cal. Rptr. 662 (1972).
59. Taureck v. Jersey City, 149 N.J. Super. 503, 374 A.2d 70 (1977); North Kingstown
v. North Kingstown Teachers Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698, 297 A.2d 342 (1972).
60. There has been considerable difficulty with provisions seeking wage parity between
various employee groups. New York in Voight v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600
(1976), and Connecticut in Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local 1219 v. Conn. Labor Rel. Bd.,
171 Conn. 342, 370 A.2d 952 (1976), have held these provisions invalid.
61. N.Y. City School Bds. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347 N.E.2d 568, 383
N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976).
62. Red Bank Bd. of Educ..v. Washington, 138 N.J. Super. 564, 351 A.2d 778 (1976);
Dublin Professional Fire Fighters v. Valley Community Service Dist., 45 Cal. App. 3d 116,
119 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1975); West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d
526 (1972).
63. Albany v. Helsby, 48 App. Div. 2d 998, 370 N.Y.S.2d 215, aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 778, 354
N.E.2d 338, 381 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1973).
64. Compare School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb.
772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972) (scheduling of work is an employer prerogative) with Local 189,
Amalgamated Meatcutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See also Biddeford Bd. of
Educ. v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973).
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Fringe benefits are widely recognized in both the private and
public sector to constitute nothing more than indirect wages, reduced hours, or a combination of both." Fringe benefits on which
bargaining is commonly required include indirect wage benefits
(such as health insurance,"6 pensions and retirement provisions, 7
and dental services"8 ) and reduced hours (sick leave,"1 vacation
leave,70 and other paid time off"). Insofar as the category represents
indirect wages and hour topics, they are mandatory subjects under
the categories of "wages" and "hours."
Bargaining subjects that come within the categories "wages,
hours, and fringe benefits" usually do not conflict with employer
prerogatives because these subjects are economic, while employer
prerogatives generally concern non-economic issues." Consequently, if bargaining is limited to economic issues, conflict with
employer prerogatives generally does not occur.
When bargaining changes from the economic issues of wages,
hours, and fringe benefits to the category "other conditions of employment" there is great potential for conflict. This occurs because
while "other conditions of employment" may refer to economic issues not fully covered by "wages, hours, and fringe benefits," employee bargaining representatives frequently rely on the term for the
introduction of non-economic policy subjects at the bargaining
table.
A great many non-economic topics find their way to the bar65. The court in J.H. Welch & Son Contracting Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 4
Ariz. App. 398, 420 P.2d 970 (1966), aff'd, 102 Ariz. 443, 432 P.2d 455 (1967), defined fringe
benefits as payments made to another for the employee's benefit, as opposed to the wage
payments made directly to the employee. See also N.J. v. Supervisory Employees Ass'n, N.J..., 393 A.2d 233, 239 (1978) (fringe benefits are "essential components of terms
and conditions of employment").
66. Brooks v. School Comm. of Floucester,
- Mass.
-, 360 N.E.2d 647 (1977).
67. Albany v. Helsby, 48 App. Div. 2d 998, 370 N.Y.S.2d 215, aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 778, 354
N.E.2d 338, 381 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1973).
68. New Jersey Civil Serv. Ass'n v. Camden, 135 N.J. Super. 308, 343 A.2d 134 (1975).
69. Syracuse Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 42 App. Div. 2d 73, 345 N.Y.S.2d 239,
aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 743, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1973).
70. South Orange-Maplewood Ed. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 146 N.J. Super. 457, 370 A.2d
47 (1977).
71. Albany v. Helsby, 48 App. Div. 2d 998, 370 N.Y.S.2d 215, aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 778, 354
N.E.2d 338, 381 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1975) (paid time for union activity).
72. This is true whether the statute recognizes certain employer prerogatives or whether
such prerogatives are implicit. For example, the Montana provision concerning employer
prerogatives contains no economic issues. See section 1I(B), supra. See also the extensive list
of employer prerogatives recognized in Nevada, supra note 46. Similarly, the Nebraska Act,
which makes no specific provision for employer prerogatives, has been interpreted to exclude
certain non-economic issues from mandatory negotiation. School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n
v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972). See also Chappell v. Comm'r
of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 565, 343 A.2d 811 (1975); Skaneateka Teachers Ass'n v. New York
State by
Public
EmploymentatRel.
Bd., 88 Misc.
2d 816, 1979
389 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1976).
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gaining table as "other conditions of employment." Topics like notice of competitive examinations for employee positions,73 penalties
for tardiness," residency requirements,7 5 transfers,76 probationary
periods, 7 evaluations, 8 staff reductions,7 discharges, 0 and special
assistance to employees having work difficulties" are all arguably
conditions of employement, yet all arguably interfere with the prerogatives of management.
2.

Other Conditions of Employment

PERBs and state courts have broadly defined "other conditions
of employment" to include those subjects, other than "wages, hours
and fringe benefits," in which employees have a legitimate employment interest. While the exact language of the "test" has differed
somewhat from state to state, non-economic subjects about which
employees have a legitimate employment interest are generally initially considered as conditions of employment.8 2 An initial determination that a topic concerns a legitimate employment interest does
not ensure that the topic is mandatory. A topic may involve a legiti73. Fire Fighters Union v. Pleasanton, 56 Cal. App. 3d 959, 129 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1976)
(held mandatory).
74. Albany v. Helsby, 48 App. Div. 2d 998, 370 N.Y.S.2d 215, aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 778, 354
N.E.2d 338, 381 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1975) (held mandatory).
75. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, 214 N.W.2d 803 (1974) (held
mandatory).
76. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 612 P.2d 426 (1973) (held mandatory).
77. Id.
78. Id; City of Beloit v. Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d
231 (1976) (held mandatory).
79. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers Ass'n, 37
N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975) (held non-mandatory).
80. Central Point School Dist. v. Employment Rel. Bd., 27 Or. App. 285,555 P.2d 1269
(1976) (held non-mandatory).
81. City of Beloit v. Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231
(1976) (held non-mandatory).
82. In West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 581, 295 A.2d 526, 534
(1972), the court discussed the importance of the "impact" of educational policy decision on
teachers' conditions of employment. Accord, Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School
Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975). The Wisconsin court used the term "primarily
related." City of Beloit v. Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 54, 242 N.W.2d
231, 236 (1976). The Nebraska court uses the phrase "matters directly affecting the teacher's
welfare." School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 784,
199 N.W.2d 752, 759 (1972). Accord, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.
2d 426 (1973). Bd. of Educ. v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n, 64 N.J. 1, 311 A.2d 729 (1973);
Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. Sutherlin School Dist., 25 Or. App. 85, 548 P.2d 204 (1976) (effect
that the subject has on a teachers employment). The South Dakota court uses the term
"materially affect." Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 88 S.D. 127, 133, 215
N.W.2d 837, 841 (1974). If the subject has a "remote and incidental effect on the terms and
conditions of employment," the topic is non-mandatory. Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen
Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 24, 311 A.2d 737, 743 (1973).
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mate employment interest as well as a non-mandatory employer
prerogative. Because conditions of employment and management
prerogatives are mutually exclusive, in the final analysis if the topic
is a condition of employment it will not be a management prerogative, and vice versa. In other words, a topic that represents a legitimate employee interest and is initially designated as a condition of
employment may lose its status as a condition of employment if the
topic is a prerogative of management. A broad definition of "other
conditions of employment" which includes all topics in which employees have a legitimate employee interest ensures that legitimate
employee bargaining concerns are recognized, and unless the topic
also concerns some overriding prerogatives of the employer, it will
ultimately be a mandatory bargaining subject. Accordingly, if a
topic represents a legitimate employment interest, the determination whether the topic is a mandatory subject of bargaining must
wait until the impact on the prerogatives of the employer is determined.
B.

Employer Prerogatives

As previously noted, state legislative treatment of employer
prerogatives varies greatly." Because of this wide variety of legislative treatment, it is impossible to find a universally accepted definition of employer prerogatives. However, two conclusions can be
drawn. Clearly the prerogatives of the employer are limited to enterprise policy interests. On the other hand, not all such policy interests are exempt from mandatory negotiation. The problem faced by
PERBs and courts is initially finding an acceptable definition of
"enterprise policy interest" and then determining whether a particular enterprise policy interest is exempt from mandatory collective
bargaining.
As a general rule, enterprise policy interest can be divided into
two categories: (1) the formulation of fundamental organization policy, and (2) the determination of the method and means to implement such policy decisions.u While these two broad categories generally represent enterprise policy interests, not all potential bargaining topics that affect one or both of these categories are nonmandatory employer prerogatives. The determination of whether a
given topic which affects policy formulation or the method and
means of policy implementation is in fact non-mandatory will be
fully discussed later." At this point, however, it can be said that a
83. Id.
84. See discussion accompanying notes 42-49, supra.
85. See section II(C)(4), infra.
Published86.
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bargaining topic which has an impact upon policy formulation or
implementation will be subject to close analysis.
The Montana Act provides that the "prerogatives of public
employees" include the operation and management of their affairs
in seven broad policy areas, but the employer prerogatives are "not
limited to" these specified areas." Most of the specific policy areas
concern the method and means of policy implementation rather
than policy formulation. Thus, the Montana Act provides that the
public employer has exclusive authority to hire, direct," assign,
promote, transfer, relieve,"' and retain employees. 0
This broad grant of personnel authority primarily concerns the
ability of the public manager to maintain control over the manner
and means of policy implementation. The authority to hire, fire,
promote, transfer, assign, and direct employees is the backbone, of
policy implementation. Many of these specific provisions may be
included in the general statutory management rights provision that
says the employer has the right to "determine the methods, means,
job classifications, and9 personnel by which government operations
are to be conducted." '
The Montana Act also provides that the employer has authority
to "maintain the efficiency of government operations" 2 and to
"take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the missions
of the agency in situations of emergency." 93 While governmental
efficiency certainly is a fundamental policy, authority to
"maintain" efficiency appears to denote the method and means of
implementation. Similarly, while it could be argued that agency
"mission" concerns the formulation of agency policy, actions to
"carry out the missions of the agency in situations of emergency"
refers to the method and means of implementing the agency mission
or policy, not the formulation of such policy. Nevertheless, Mon87. MCA § 39-31-303 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(2) (Supp.
1977)).
88. In addition to the prerogative to "direct," the Act provides that the employer has
the prerogative to "establish the method and process by which work is performed." MCA §
39-31-303(7) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(2)(g) (Supp. 1977)).
89. The Act specifies that the employer may "relieve employees from duties because of
lack of work or funds or other conditions where. continuation of such work would be inefficient
and non-productive." MCA § 39-31-303(3) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 591603(2)(c) (Supp. 1977)).
90. MCA § 39-31-303 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(2) (Supp.
1977)).
91. MCA § 39-31-303(5) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(2)(e)
(Supp. 1977)).
92. MCA § 39-31-303(4) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(2)(d)
(Supp. 1977)).
93. MCA § 39-31-303(6) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(2)(f)
(Supp. 1977)).
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tana's statutory management rights clause is replete with specific
directives regarding the method or means of implementing public
policy.
It could be argued that despite the passing reference to governmental "efficiency," "operations," and "missions," there is no specific delineation of the employer prerogative in policy formulation;
while the legislature recognized management prerogatives in
method and means of policy implementation, it did not designate
policy formulation as a prerogative. While this position may arguably be correct from a perspective of narrow statutory construction,
it is without reason or precedent in the law.
Courts have unanimously agreed that while not every issue that
can be considered policy formulation is exempt from bargaining,
bargaining topics that have an impact on the formulation of policy
are a suspect group.' Even in those states where the legislatures
have failed to address the subject of employer prerogatives, courts
have held that employer prerogatives in matters of policy are an
implicit limitation on the mandatory subjects of bargaining. "
Courts agree that non-mandatory subjects of bargaining represent
fundamental employer interests and that no employer interest is
more fundamental than establishing the primary objectives of the
enterprise. The cornerstone of employer prerogatives is the recognition that the public employer must be allowed to establish fundamental policy without being required to negotiate the matter with
its employees. While it is arguable that the Montana legislature
could have stated this principle more clearly in its broad definition
of public employers' prerogatives, there can be no doubt that the
formulation of fundamental policy is a management prerogative."
Regardless of what other topics may be recognized as employer
prerogatives under the "not limited to" clause, employer prerogatives in Montana represent a relatively broad area of policy formulation and policy implementation topics. The actual parameter of the
statutory employer rights clause must be determined on a case-by94. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); Nat'l
Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ. 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973); School Committee of Hanover
v. Curry, 369 Mass. 683, 343 N.E.2d 144 (1976); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School
Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d 752 (1972); Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen
Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973); Skaneateles Teachers Ass'n v. New York State
Public Employment Rel. Bd., 88 Misc. 2d 816, 389 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1976); Sutherlin Educ.
Ass'n v. Sutherlin School Dist., 25 Or. App. 85, 548 P.2d 204 (1976); Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v.
State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975); City of Beloit v. Wis.
Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1975).
95. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526 (1972); Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973).
96. See text accompanying note 137, supra.
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case basis." A broad definition of employer rights does not necessarily mean that the scope of mandatory negotiations is proportionately narrowed. As was previously indicated, a broad initial definition of "conditions of employment" is not determinative of whether
the subject is mandatory or non-mandatory. Indeed, a broad definition only indicates that the employees have a legitimate interest in
the topic. Similarly, a broad definition of employer prerogatives
includes a large number of topics in which the public employer has
a legitimate interest in exempting from the bargaining process. It
is quite likely that a potential topic of bargaining will touch upon
both the employee's legitimate interest and public employer's prerogative. State PERBs and courts have long recognized this potential conflict.98 Many bargaining topics will touch upon both conditions of employment and employer prerogatives and frequently the
line separating these two statutory categories is almost indistinguishable. It is therefore better to accept the inevitability of this
potential conflict and devise an appropriate method for its resolution, rather than formulate an unrealistically limited definition of
employee interests and employer prerogatives which does not fairly
consider the respective interests of each.
C. A Balancing Formula for the Resolution
of Conflicting Employee-Employer Interests
Most courts recognize that a narrow construction of conditions
of employment and employer prerogatives does not fairly represent
the legitimate interests of either group. 9 It is possible to resolve
whether a particular subject is mandatory or non-mandatory and
still recognize legitimate employee-employer interests. At first
glance, PERBs and courts have resolved this issue without formulating any consistent standards; however, upon close analysis they
have most frequently used a balancing formula. 00 A balancing for97. As the Pennsylvania court noted, "we also recognize the wisdom of refraining from
attempting to fashion broad and general rules that would serve as a panacea. The obviously
wiser course is to resolve disputes on a case-by-case basis until we develop, through experience
in the area, a sound basis for developing overall principles." Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. State
College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262, 265 (1975). City of Beloit v. Wis.
Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W.2d 231 (1975). Accord, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n
v. Bd. of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973).
98. See text accompanying notes 50-51, supra.
99. See id.
100. The test to be applied in determining whether a proposed subject is a "condition
of employment" and therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining, as opposed to permissive,
is to "balance the element of... policy involved against the effect that the subject has no
[employees'] employment." Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n v. Sutherlin School Dist., 25 Or. App.
85, 584 P.2d 204, 205 (1976). Accord, Biddeford Bd. of Educ. v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n,
304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973); Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d
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mula allows full recognition of legitimate employee interests in bargaining and the employer's concerns over its inherent prerogatives.
If the legitimate interests of the employees in the subject outweighs
the employer's concern, the topic is mandatory and the employer is
required to bargain in good faith to impasse. If the legitimate concerns of the employer outweigh the legitimate interests of the employees, the subject is non-mandatory.
Stating the balancing formula is much easier than applying it
to a specific subject of bargaining. Although balancing competing
interests is never an easy task, it is a cornerstone of decision making,
and courts and administrative agencies are particularly familiar
with the process. Application of the balancing formula has given
state PERBs and courts much difficulty, not because they fail to
understand how to balance competing interests, but because they
are not familiar with the unique characteristics and concerns that
underlie public sector collective bargaining. They also often do not
understand the applicable competing interests. Failure to correctly
perceive the competing interests and the unique framework in which
the decision will operate results in decision making which distorts
rather than enforces public sector bargaining. One of the most common errors of decision makers is to rely on the resolution of similar
issues in the private sector for guidance or precedent in the public
sector.
1.

The Inappropriatenessof Reliance on Private Sector Decisions

As noted previously, a large body of law has been developed
under the NLRA resolving conflicts between conditions of employment and employer prerogatives. Because this large body of private
sector case law exists, some state PERBs and courts have turned to
these private sector decisions for assistance in resolving similar pub737 (1973); Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 512 P.2d 426 (1973); Pa. Labor
Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975). A few courts
have relied upon the "significant relations" standard to resolve this overlap problem. Under
this test, the subject is mandatory if it is found to be "significantly related to wages, hours,
and other conditions of employment even though that item is also related to management
prerogative." Clark City School Dist. v. Local Gov't Employees Management Rel. Bd., 90
Nev. 442, 446-447, 530 P.2d 114, 117 (1974). See also Los Angeles County Dept. of Public
Social Service and Dept. of Personnel, 33 Cal. App. 3d 1, 108 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1973).
The significant relations test represents a distinct bias towards negotiability because it
focuseq on only one-half of the overlap problem. Because it considers only the interests of the
employees and is blind to the employer concerns, it is not an appropriate method of determining scope of bargaining. See Cent. Mich. Univ. Faculty Ass'n v. Cent. Mich. Univ.,
Mich. __,
273 N.W.2d 21, 31 (1978) (Coleman, J., dissenting). See also Sackman,
Redefining the Scope of Bargaining in Public Employment, 19 B. C. L. REv. 155, 176-177
(1978); Bd. of Educ. v. Woodstown Educ. Ass'n, N.J. __,
395 A.2d 884 (1978). The
balancing formula avoids this bias by recognizing both employee and employer interests.
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lic sector bargaining issues. 01 This reliance is inappropriate because
of the fundamental differences between the public and private sector. The differences are particularly relevant in determining the
scope of collective bargaining. Frequently, PERBs and courts preface their analysis with the statement that there are obvious differences between the public and private sector. To the extent these
differences affect the determination of the proper scope of public
sector bargaining, the precedent of the private sector should not be
controlling. Once the PERB or court has indicated that a distinction
between the public and private sector may preclude the adoption
of the private sector rationale in the public sector, the court or
PERB then reviews how similar issues have been resolved in the
private sector. 02
This approach is appropriate only if the PERB or court appreciates the distinction between the public and private sectors. Unless
the decision maker appreciates the distinction, it is in no position
to evaluate the private sector precedent. All too often, the decision
maker merely pays lip service to an undefined distinction between
the public and private sectors, considers the precedent of the private
sector and then decides the weight that is to be accorded the private
sector precedent. Because the decision maker fails properly to concern itself with the differences between the private and public sectors, a determination on how similar competing interests were resolved in the private sector does not provide any insight on whether
this rationale should be adopted in the public sector. Failure to
draw the distinction between private and public collective bargaining results in less-than-accurate decisions and in the long run creates a lack of predictability in decision making. This confusion will
be eliminated and predictability will prevail when a definitional
framework exists from which to operate. 03
On occasion, state PERBs and courts have noted that the obvious difference between private and public sector bargaining is the
101. See note 27, supra.
102. As one court noted, the language establishing mandatory subjects is patterned
after the NLRA, and "[flor this reason the judicial interpretation frequently accorded the
federal act is of great assistance and persuasive force in the interpretation of our own acts."
West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 579, 295 A.2d 526, 534 (1972). See
also Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975);
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 320 v. City of Minneapolis, 302 Minn. 410, 225 N.W.2d 254
(1975).
103. As one author indicates, the deicisons do not "reveal much about which factors
are considered . . . and are unfortunately conclusory in nature and one is left to guess at the
elements which have been subjected to a complex balancing process." Weisberger, The Appropriate Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Continuing Controversy and the
Wisconsin Experience, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 685, 735.
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government's presence as the employer in the latter situation. 04 The
employer's identity is a rudimentary distinction, but absent further
articulation, it does not adequately define the proper sphere of public employee collective bargaining or afford an adequate method of
comparing it with its private sector counterpart. More attention
must be given to this definitional task prior to balancing the competing interests. Without an understanding of these competing interests, a decision affecting these interests will be little more than
arbitrary. Not only must the decision maker understand the framework in which the decision will operate, the decision maker must
succinctly state that framework. PERBs and courts must establish
guidelines to direct the resolution of future controversies in this area
of decision making. These guidelines will be critical in avoiding
controversies at the bargaining table as they will direct the parties
on the appropriate method and considerations to be used in resolving the scope of bargaining controversies. A major goal of collective
bargaining is to minimize employee-employer disruptions, 05 yet the
failure to provide adequate guidelines for the resolution of scope-ofbargaining problems only increases these disruptions.
2. The Distinction between Collective Bargaining in the Private
and Public Sectors: The Operative Constraintsand the Bargaining
Process'"
Economic considerations are the primary constraints on the
scope of collective bargaining in the private sector. Every decision
of the private sector employer has economic consequences. While
the private sector employer undoubtedly offers some product or
service, the continued offering of the product or service is contingent
upon a favorable economic position. It is the accountant's bottom
line that determines the success or failure of the private sector employer. Like every other private sector decision when reduced to its
common denominator, collective bargaining is merely a method to
determine the employee's share of the'economic pie. All employee
demands have an economic impact on the employer. The employer
104. State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Rel. Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 236, 306
A.2d 404, 409 (1973); Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n. 64 N.J. at 17, 311 A.2d
at 740. See also West Hartford Educ. Ass'n. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 516, 295 A.2d 526 (1972).
105. "Experience has proven that protection by law of the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and
unrest . . . ." NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). The Montana Act is accord. See MCA § 3931-101 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1601 (Supp. 1977)).
106. See generally H. WELLINGTON, R. WunTER, Ja., THE UNIONS AND THE CreES (1971);
Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Summers].
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is aware of this economic impact and is motivated by economic
constraints at the bargaining table. It is the actual, perceived, or
desired economic position of the private sector employer which
"draws the line" during bargaining.
The employer seeks to preserve his control of the enterprise and
limit the amount of employee control. At the bargaining table the
employer can give only a portion of the economic resources of the
enterprise. How much the private employer may be willing to give
is based upon his conception of the amount of economic resources
that must be retained by the enterprise, such as its position in the
industry, its current financial status, and its growth prospectus.
Where economics is the operative constraint on bargaining, the
scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining can be broadly defined.
The private sector employer is in a position to determine how much
of the economic pie to give the employees. If a bargaining subject is
mandatory, the employer is required to bargain with the employee
representative in good faith; he need not agree or make concessions.
Thus the employer is in a position to mold the collective bargaining
package, not only as to the amount of the economic benefits given,
but also to the type of benefits given in the form of wages and
benefits, hours, and job security. The only non-mandatory topics
affecting the employee-employer relationship are within the category of subjects which "lie at the core of the entrepeneurial control,"' 17 or those that ultimately concern the direction and control
of the enterprise. This category is narrowly defined in the private
sector because every private sector bargaining topic will involve
economic consequences, and the employer has ample incentive to
negotiate the parameters of the employee economic package. Accordingly, mandatory subjects of bargaining are broadly defined in
the private sector because from the employer's position the result
can be reduced to dollars and cents, a constraint of which the employer is uniquely aware and motivated to limit. Moreover, as one
author has noted, in the "[pirivate sector collective bargaining is
the only instrument through which employees have an effective
voice in determining terms and conditions of employment." The
process is one of industrial democracy, and thus many subjects are
open to bargaining.08
In contrast to the private sector model, the ultimate employer
in the public sector is the public. The public is represented in its
"employer capacity" by a public entity (a governor, mayor, county
commission, city council, or school board) that operates in the dual
107.
108.

See text accompanying notes 38 and 39, supra.
Summers, supra note 106, at 1193.
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capacity of policy maker and manager. As a public policy maker,
the entity must listen, consider, and respond to the conflicting interests of all groups in the community, including the public employees.
The determination of public policy is a multilateral process in which
all public interest groups participate. The amount of public resources allocated to any one public interest group is determined in
a forum in which all groups participate. Thus, in the public sector
the operative constraint is politics, not economics.101
The public entity in its role as employer-manager and policy
maker is charged with the operation of the public facility. The public employer does not enter the bargaining process attempting to
protect only an economic interest; rather, he enters in the dual
capacity of employer-manager and public policy maker. He looks
not only to his accountant during negotiations, but to the larger
community. The public employer's strength ultimately is measured
on whether it can successfully accommodate the interests of the
entire community and not the demands of any one particular
0
group.",
A second major distinction between the public and private sector is the effect the introduction of collective bargaining has on the
decision making process. Prior to the introduction of collective bargaining in the private sector, the employer controlled the decision
making process. The introduction of collective bargaining broadened this unilateral process into a bilateral process in which both
the employer and the employees participate."'
The introduction of collective bargaining in the public sector
had the opposite effect. It narrowed rather than broadened the decision making process. Prior to collective bargaining in the public
sector, decision making was a multilateral process." 2 The process
109. The "difference between the public and private bargaining relates to the social
costs. The social costs of collective bargaining in the private sector are principally economic
and seem inherently limited by market forces. In the public sector, however, the costs [are]
economic only in a very narrow sense and are on the whole political. Further, to the extent
union power is delineated by market forces in the private sector, these constraints do not come
into play nearly as quickly as in the private." H. Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1117 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Wellington & Winter]. See also Shaw & Clark, The PracticalDifferences Between Public and
Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 867, 874 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Shaw & Clark]; D.H. Wollett, Collective Bargainingin the Public Sector-A Spherical
Perspective, REPORT OF SEmINAR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS (Univ. of Kentucky College of.Law 1977).
110. As the Pennsylvania court stated, "Employers in the private sector are motivated
by the profit to be returned from the enterprise whereas public employers are custodians of
public funds and mandated to perform governmental functions as economically and effectively as possible." Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337
A.2d 262, 264 (1975).
111. Summers, supra note 106, at 1164.
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included the participation of various citizen and interest groups.
With the introduction of collective bargaining, the decision making
process was reduced to a bilateral process between the public employer and its employees. The extent of this reduction depends on
how the scope of bargaining is defined. If the scope of bargaining is
broadly defined, many significant topics previously subject to multilateral consideration are now subject to scrutiny only by the employee interest group. Consequently, public participation and influence in the political decision making is reduced and the influence
of employee organizations is increased.
Reduction of public sector decision making from a multilateral
to a bilateral process distorts public decision making if the employees receive a disproportionate amount of power vis-a-vis all other
interest groups in the community."' Given the increased access and
influence accorded the employee organization over all other interest
groups where the operative constraint is political, it can be expected
that any resulting decision will favor the employee organization.
Because of this fundamental effect on the public sector decision
making process, defining the scope of bargaining becomes critical.
An extremely broad scope of bargaining in the public sector may
cause decision making previously done after extensive public participation to be made at a bargaining table with public employees.
This result adversely effects full public participation on public issues.
Because this potentially adverse effect on public sector decision
making is not found in the private sector absent clear legislative
intent,I" PERBs and courts should not look to the private sector for
113. Id. at 1162-63.
114. As one author states, "Such blind deference to NLRA precedent . . . seem[s]
unwarranted. If the legislature intended the state act to be construed in accordance with
NLRA precedent, it could have so provided. For example, the California Agriculture Labor
Relations Act provides that the Agricultural Labor Relations Board 'shall follow applicable
precedents of the National Labor Relations Act as amended.'" Clark, supra note 13, at 97,
citing CAL. LABOR CODE § 1148 (West. 1975).
115. Those courts which have relied on the private sector for the resolution of scope of
bargaining issues often have been confronted with scope of bargaining language identical to
or closely patterned after the federal act. However, even these courts recognize the distinction
between the private and public sector and have relied on private sector precedent only to the
extent it is applicable to the public sector. For example, despite the fact that the Michigan
Act contains language identical to the federal act, the Michigan court concluded that it
should rely on federal precedent only "to the extent that they apply to public sector bargaining." Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit Police Dept., 61 Mich. App. 487, 490, 233 N.W.2d
49, 51 (1975). After recognizing that federal law may be helpful in resolving scope issues,
however, the Michigan court concluded: "[W]e are compelled to fashion rules which recognize the special problems which exist in the public sector." Int'l Union of Operating Engineers
v. Minneapolis, 305 Minn. 364, 368, 233 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1975). After looking at federal
precedent, the court said that "[a]lthough these decisions may provide some guidance, we
are mindful of the distinctions that necessarily must exist between legislation primarily
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol40/iss2/2
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guidance in resolving scope of bargaining issues in the public sector."' How an issue was resolved in the private sector may provide
no insight on how the issue should be determined in the public
sector, and while the private sector experience under the NLRA is
relevant in a number of areas,"' the private sector experience in
determining the scope of bargaining is not applicable. Accordingly,
when a state PERB or court weighs competing employee or employer interests in a particular bargaining topic, it should do so in
light of the unique effect collective bargaining has on public sector
decision making.
directed to the private sector and that for public employees." Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. State
College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975).
Where a court must resolve a scope of bargaining issue and the statutory language differs
from the federal act, there is even less reason to rely on the private sector approach, absent a
clearly expressed legislative intent. The same is true where a state act adds language not
found in the federal act.
The statutory scheme for resolving scope of bargaining issues in Montana differs significantly from the federal act, in that scope questions must be resolved recognizing the particular "prerogatives of public employers." MCA § 39-31-303 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M.
1947, § 59-1603(2) (Supp. 1977)). Thus, the resolution of scope of bargaining issues in Montana must be undertaken with a clear distinction between the public and private sectors.
116. For example, the Montana court properly has considered federal precedent regarding the term "employer" in construing the term under the Montana Act. See Local 2390, Am.
Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Billings, 171 Mont. 20, 22, 555
P.2d 507, 508 (1976). Construction of "concerted activities" to include employee strikes under
the federal act are also relevant in construing an identical provision in the Montana Act. See
State Dept. of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 351, 529 P.2d
785, 786 (1974) (reasoning that if the legislature intented to prohibit public employee strikes,
it would not have used language from the federal act).
Another author has written "although N.L.R.B. decisions are not controlling ...
they
are usually considered, and may well be persuasive, in circumstances . . . regarding an
appropriate bargainingunit or the existence of an unfair labor practice." Loring, supra note
16, at 48-49 (emphasis added). The determination of these questions requires consideration
of various factors, most of which have been identified during the forty-year construction of
the federal act. Their application to similar questions under the Montana Act is clearly
appropriate.
The underlying issue in unit determinations is whether a group of employees shares a
"community of interest" sufficient to place them within the same unit for collective bargaining purposes. The NLRB considers this standard along with underlying factors in making
such a determination. See GoRMAN, supra note 24, at 69. Thus, they are certainly applicable
to identical questions in the public sector. The same is true in determining whether an unfair
labor practice has been committed, in which case the issue is resolved by a common analysis
which can be applied in most all circumstances. See Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. Mars Area School
Dist., __
Pa. , _ 389 A.2d 1073, 1076 (1978).
Alternatively, when the issue involves the scope of bargaining in the public sector, the
state tribunal must consider and decide the issue in light of the unique circumstances of the
public sector and the impact the decision will have on public sector decision making. See text
accompanying notes 103-05, supra.
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3. Public Sector Decison Making: The Role of Collective
Bargaining
Collective bargaining's impact on the public sector decisionmaking process not only reveals why reliance on the private sector
model for resolving public sector scope of negotiation issues is inappropriate, but also provides an insight into public sector decision
making. The public enterprise must ensure public participation in
decisions that are of fundamental concern. This has traditionally
been achieved through a decision-making process that encourages
contributions from the often-conflicting community interests. Of
course, not all public sector decisions are made after the public has
been afforded an opportunity to participate. In fact, the great majority of decisions regarding the day-to-day operations are made
without'direct public participation. However, when the issue involves a fundamental policy question, it is likely that the public will
seek to participate or such broad-based public participation will be
sought. When fundamental public policy issues are at stake, the
decison-making process should not be defined so as to preclude or
inhibit public participation. To do so would announce the end of
democratic control over public processes.
Multilateral public participation on fundamental issues not
only distinguishes public sector from private sector decision making, but identifies those principles underlying public sector decison
making. Collective bargaining, as discussed earlier, is a bilateral
decison making process. This use of the bilateral decision making
process is appropriate only when wider public participation is not
necessary. The bilateral process is appropriate in the private sector
on a wide range of subjects because the need for broader participation does not arise. However, when the topics in the public sector
are of fundamental public interest, the bilateral process is inappropriate. Thus, the appropriateness of bilateral collective bargaining
in the public sector depends on whether the issue involves fundamental public concern. If a fundamental concern is involved, public
participation is required for its proper consideration and resolution,
and the bilateral process is inappropriate. Any other conclusion
would result in locking out the public from the formulation of public
policy. If the issue is not of fundamental public interest it may be
resolved in the bilateral process.
The recognition that some decisions require multilateral public
participation, and the inappropriateness of the bilateral collective
bargaining process to those decisions, is unique to the public sector.
The scope of collective bargaining in the public sector depends upon
the definition of those topics that are of fundamental public concern. Accordingly, the scope of collective bargaining in the public 28
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sector involves a new element not present in the private sector: "the
public interest." In the public sector two separate and distinct policy elements constitute employer prerogatives: the employer's interest in the operation and management of the public enterprise, and
the public's interest in fundamental policy formulation. Of course,
every public enterprise decision touches on some policy issues. This
is equally true of every decision made and every issue considered
during collective bargaining. However, this does not mean that
every collective bargaining subject that affects the employer's managerial interest in policy implementation or the public's interest in
policy formulation is exempt from collective bargaining. The balancing formula to measure and weigh the competing employeeemployer interests must be used to determine whether the bargaining subject is mandatory or non-mandatory.
For example, there is general agreement that economic issues
(that is, wages, hours, and fringe benefits) are mandatory subjects
of bargaining, because the legitimate interests of the employees
outweigh any employer policy implementation interests. In fact,
because employer prerogatives are limited to "policy" issues, nonpolicy economic issues do not interfere with the employer's prerogatives. It could be argued that when the "public interest" component
is added to the balancing formula, the balance shifts in favor of the
employer and the public. However, this shift does not occur because
public interest in economic issues is expressed in a non-bargaining
forum.
Certainly, the taxpaying public will be concerned with the economic benefits paid to public employees, since the total amount
directly affects government expenditures and tax levels. In an era
of Proposition Thirteen-type state intiatives," it would be ridiculous to suggest that the public is not interested in the amount of
economic benefits paid to public employees. Indeed, these expenditures account for a significant amount of total government expenditures." 8 However, the exclusion of the direct public interest from the
117. Proposition Thirteen was a California state ballot initiative that required a reduction in property taxes.
118. Payroll cost in most cities constitutes 60 to 70 percent of the total operating
budget. D. STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GovERNMENT UNDER LOCAL UNION PRESSURE 120 (1972).
In public education salaries and fringe benefits account for 65 percent. Simon, The School
Finance Decision maker: Collective Bargaining& FutureFinance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 409,
413 (1973). Government is the country's largest industry and employer. Nearly 17 percent of
all civilian employees work for federal, state or local government and school systems. U.S.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 343 (1975). Moreover, the most rapid
rate of governmental employment growth is not at the federal level. The number of county
employees in the U.S. rose by 4.9 percent in the year ending October 1975, as some 73,000
workers were added to county payrolls. This was the fastest rate of growth among all types
of state and local government. State rolls increased by 3.6 percent; city employees were
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collective bargaining process does not result in the total exclusion
of the public interest. Rather, the public has an opportunity to
participate on economic issues in the multilateral budgetappropriation process which precedes collective bargaining and determines the aggregate amount and allocation of public funds to be
expended on employee economic benefits. In the event collective
bargaining precedes budgeting, any collective bargaining agreement
must condition economic benefits upon the appropriation of adequate funds." 9 Because the public is afforded this opportunity to
participate, the "public interest" need not again be considered in
the collective bargaining process. 210
It has also been argued that bilateral collective bargaining on
economic issues is appropriate because of the disproportionately
large number of taxpayers who favor limiting taxes versus the number of public and non-public employees who favor increased tax
expenditures. "' Even though public employees will have more political influence on economic issues because of the bilateral process,
this political influence is diminished when compared to the large
number of non-public employee taxpayers who oppose increased
government expenditures and may voice this opposition during
budgeting and increased mill levy elections.
However, when the topic of negotiation shifts from economic to
"policy" issues, the bilateral forum may be inappropriate because
on any given "policy issue" there may not be any sufficient opposition on any particular issue to counterbalance the increased influence public employees gain from their bilateral forum. Without sufficient political strength to force public consideration of a significant policy issue, important policy would be determined in a forum
where the only interest group represented was the public employees.
If public policy is to represent the public interest, the forum in
which it is determined must ensure, or at least permit, public parreduced by 1.2 percent; federal employment during the same period remained nearly unchanged. LABoR RELATIONS YEAR BOOK 66-67 (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1976).
119. The Montana Act specifically provides that the requirement of negotiating in good
faith for state employers "may be met by submission of a negotiated settlement to the
legislature in the executive budget, or by bill or joint resolution." MCA § 39-31-305(3) (1978)
(formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1605(4) (Supp. 1977)).
120. After the budget-making process is complete, the public employer may, where
lawful, abandon the budgeted line item monetary constraint on employee economic benefits
in response to an unanticipated higher collectively-bargained economic package. However,
he may do so only by decreasing other line items, such as the budgeted amount on plant and
equipment, or by raising taxes. In either event the employer activities will not go unnoticed
by the public. Because the public employer and the legislative body are politically responsible
for the budget, their fluctuating. responsiveness to the public in budget making and implementation will be evaluated and judged by the public. Accordingly, a public employer cannot
long budget low and contract high without the tacit approval of the public.
121. Summers, supra note 106, at 1194.
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ticipation. The bilateral forum excludes public participation and
when fundamental public policy is formulated in a forum which
excludes public participation, the process is contrary to the most
rudimentary democratic principles.
It is not enough that the public employer is designated (by way
of election or appointment) to act as the representative of the public. Certainly the public employer is the representative of the public,
but democratic decision making envisions more than elections. It
involves a continuing dialogue between the public and the representatives concerning the formulation of fundamental public policy.
It would be difficult to argue persuasively that once the public
elected a school board, their participation in the formulation of
fundamental school policy had ended, and that henceforth all school
policy would be discussed and formulated in a decision making
forum which excluded parents or any other public interest group
except teachers. However, if fundamental school policy is determined within the scope of collective bargaining, this might occur
because the formulation of school policy would be subject to the
bilateral forum, which would exclude participation of all but the
employees.
To allow public participation in public sector decision making
except where the subject is raised during collective bargaining also
would be acceptable. Frequently, the most significant policy issues
are raised for the first time during contract negotiations. It would
be impossible, absent actual public participation, for the public
employer to foresee and evaluate the diverse comments the public
might express. Actual participation is the cornerstone of democratic
decision making. Replacing participation with a system where the
public decision maker attempts to determine the public consensus
without actual participation is not only at odds with democratic
decision making, but will often result in inaccurate assessments of
the public will. Public consensus is formulated through the actual
exchange of ideas and participation, sparked by a proposal or event.
A decision-making process which withholds the proposal or event
from the public will not spark the necessary exchange of ideas. Any
attempt to assess the direction of the public discourse, predict the
formulation of alliances, the exertion of political pressures, or the
point of consensus in the absence of such a discourse will be foolhardy as well as inaccurate.
Moreover, the public employer will not necessarily support the
public consensus even if it can be accurately assessed. 22 The position of the public employer on a bargaining proposal may be at odds
122.

Id. at 1196-97.
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with the public interest. For example, suppose the bargaining representative of a group of police officers proposed the abolition of a
public-controlled police review board. The public employer bargaining representative may favor the proposal despite the fact that the
proposal significantly affects a policy issue about which the public
is concerned.12 Because the bargaining representative generally favors the proposal, it is unlikely that the public interest will be
considered if the issue is confined solely to a bilateral collective
bargaining forum. Similarly, where the topic of bargaining concerns
a policy issue on which the employer and the employee representative have no expertise, yet expertise is available and would be considered in a multilateral forum, it is impossible for the public employer to represent the public interest.
It could be argued that the public can communicate its position
on a topic to the public employer without preempting the collective
bargaining process. The public would be expected to communicate
its concern on fundamental policy issues prior to or contemporaneous with the bilateral collective bargaining process. In this manner, the public would participate in the decision-making process by
making its concerns known to the public employer and not preempt
bilateral collective bargaining. Thus, decision making would operate on a dual track; on a bilateral collective bargaining track, decisions may be made on matters of fundamental interest to the public
and on a separate multilateral track in which the public would have
an opportunity to express its views on public policy issues considered in collective bargaining. As a result, fundamental questions of
public interest would not be exempt from collective bargaining if
the issue was the subject of consideration in a multilateral forum.
From a theoretical perspective this approach has much appeal.
Realistically, it is unworkable. First, the public will not be in a
position to comment on bargaining proposals until the bargaining
process has commenced. Typically, the public employee bargaining
representative does not deliver its bargaining proposals until shortly
before the actual bargaining process commences. Therefore, multilateral consideration prior to bargaining is limited to theoretical or
anticipated bargaining proposals. It cannot be expected that the
public would discuss such theoretical proposals or that the level of
participation would be meaningful. Moreover, because employees
traditionally seek more than they expect to gain in collective bargaining, it would be virtually impossible for the public employer to
receive multilateral consideration on all the employee potential bar123. See San Jose Peace Officers Ass'n v. San Jose, 78 Cal. App. 3d 935, 948-9, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 638, 647 (1978). See also Summers, supra note 106, at 1196-97.
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gaining proposals. Only after it becomes clear, through the collective bargaining process, that a particular topic is a strong employee
concern and may become part of the collective bargaining agreement will the public be aroused to participate. However, to ensure
public input at this stage in collective bargaining would, as a practical matter, result in suspension of collective bargaining, and greatly
increase the time necessary to conclude contract negotiations.' 4
Moreover, if the collective bargaining process is open to multilateral
consideration, it will be impossible to limit that consideration to
specific issues. As a result, the entire collective bargaining process
will be transformed into a public referendum. This would certainly
be the demise of any meaningful bilateral collective bargaining.
Even if the risks involved were worth taking, it would be difficult for the public to learn of those bargaining proposals in which
there was fundamental public interest. In many states, including
Montana, collective bargaining sessions are exempt from open
meeting legislation. 2 5 Accordingly, the public can be excluded from
the collective bargaining sessions. Moreover, citizens are not entitled to receive copies of the collective bargaining proposals under
state freedom of information legislation. 2 In other words, the public
would have to rely on the negotiating parties to reveal which, if any,
bargaining issues were of fundamental public interest. This is
clearly unworkable as the parties will undoubtedly prefer to settle
the issues themselves. Additionally, the determination of those issues of fundamental public concern should not be left to the negotiating parties to define. Frequently it is to the best advantage of both
the public employer and the employee representative to withhold
controversial topics from the public, especially if the bargaining
parties have reached some mutually agreeable consensus on the
particular topic.'2 Thus, reliance on the parties to divulge those
topics of fundamental public concern often will be poorly placed.
124. While multilateral consideration of an issue could continue on other topics, as a
practical matter the most controversial issues to be considered are considered only after the
less controversial issues are resolved. As a consequence, those issues which are of fundamental
concern to the public will be delayed until the close of negotiations. If the collective bargaining process is suspended for a multilateral consideration of any one or a number of these
remaining issues, it is highly likely that there will be other issues upon which the bargaining
parties can continue negotiations on a meaningful basis.
125. See MCA § 2-3-203(3) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 82-3402). See
also Burlington School Dist. v. Public Employment Rel. Bd., 96 L.R.R.M. 2571 (Iowa Dist.
Ct. 1977).
126. See, e.g., Cohalan v. Bd. of Educ. of Bay-Port-Blue School Dist., 99 L.R.R.M. 2465
(N.Y.S.C. 1978). In Montana the public is entitled to inspect and copy "public writings,"
see MCA § 2-6-102 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1001); but it cannot be
argued that an agreement in the process of being negotiated is a public writing. See MCA §
2-6-101 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1001).
127.
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Finally, it has been argued that the consideration of fundamental public policy topics in bilateral collective bargaining does not
adversely affect public policy decision making. The public employer
is only required to bargain in good faith. He is not required to agree
to the collective bargaining position advocated by the employee
representative. 2 As previously discussed, if the topic is a mandatory subject for negotiation, the public employer need not make any
concession on the topic. However, the fact that the public employer
is not required to agree to the position of the employee representative is an inadequate reason to conclude that fundamental policy
decisions are appropriate for consideration in a bilateral collective
bargaining forum. If a topic is appropriate for decision making solely
in a multilateral forum where all interest groups may participate,
consideration of the topic should not be limited to a bilateral setting. It is ridiculous to require an employer to bargain in good faith
in a bilateral forum on a topic that is appropriate solely in a multilateral forum. If the employer recognized the multilateral nature of
the topic and refused to bargain, he is subject to an unfair labor
practice charge for failing to bargain on a mandatory subject.' 9 If
he agress to bargain, but recognizes that because of the forum an
agreement would be inappropriate, he again may be charged with
an unfair labor practice for failing to bargain in good faith. 30 The
employer is caught in a "Catch 22." Accordingly, if consideration
of a particular bargaining topic is appropriate in only a multilateral
forum, its consideration should not be mandated in a bilateral
forum.
4.

Legislative Foundations for Public Interest Considerations

Although courts recognize the crucial role that the "public interest" plays in deciding scope-of-bargaining questions, they have
128. See Weisberger, supra note 13, at 719; Seitz, "School Board Authority and the
Right of Public School Teachers to Negotiate-a Legal Analysis," 22 VAND. L. REv. 239, 253
(1969); Joint School Dist. v. Wis. Employment Rel. Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 488, 155 N.W.2d
711, 712 (1971).
129. See State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Rel. Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 23536, 306 A.2d 404, 408-09 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
130. San Jose Peace Officers Ass'n v. City of San Jose, 78 Cal. App. 3d 935, 948, 144
Cal. Rptr. 638, 646 (1978).
It consistently has been determined if an employer commences collective bargaining on
a mandatory subject with a non-compromising position against the proposal and refuses to
negotiate on the subject, the employer may be found to have refused to bargain in good faith.
Moreover, an employer may not merely go through the motions of collective bargaining by
an elaborate pretense of empty talk and surface motions without a sincere desire to reach an
agreement. The employer must enter negotiations with an open mind on the topic for good
faith negotiations to occur. However, if the topic may be considered only in a multilateral
forum, it is senseless to shackle the public employer with totally inconsistent duties-a duty
to the employees to bargain and a duty to the public not to agree.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol40/iss2/2
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often been less than candid in identifying the legislative basis for
their determination. Frequently, public employee collective bargaining legislation explicitly states that an underlying policy of public sector bargaining is the furtherance of the "public interest."
Courts may rely on this explicit legislative purpose as authority for
consideration of the "public interest" in deciding the scope-ofbargaining questions. Even when the legislation does not specify a
"public interest" purpose, proper construction requires that the legislation be construed in a manner consistent with the public interest.' 3' This is particularly true when the legislation is directed at the
regulation of the public enterprise. Certainly, the scope of collective
bargaining in the public sector cannot be defined in a manner inconsistent with public interest.
The Montana Act specifically provides that "[in order to
promote public business . . . it is the policy of the state to encourage . . .collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustments of

all disputes between public employers and their employees.' 32 To
insure the promotion of the "public business" the scope of public
employee collective bargaining must reflect the public interest. The
balancing formula, used to define whether a topic is a mandatory
subject of bargaining, must reflect the public interest. Thus, the
balancing formula must reflect not only the interests of the employees and managerial interests of the employer, but the interest of the
public as well.
Some courts have used an alternative approach, the delegation
theory, for concluding that the scope of bargaining must reflect the
public interest. Under this theory, the public employer has been
delegated the authority to act in the public interest by the state
constitution or the legislature. It cannot evade that responsibility by
delegating authority or a portion thereof to any group.13 These
courts reason that when the collective bargaining process involves
issues of public policy,'3 ' the determination of public policy is trans131. See, e.g., State College Educ. Ass'n v. Pa. Labor Rel. Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229,
241-42, 306 A.2d 404, 412 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262 (1975).
132. MCA § 29-21-101 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1601 (Supp.
1977)).
133. See Bd. of Trustees v. Cook City College Teachers' Union, Ind. ...
343 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1976); Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 750, 512 P.2d
426, 433 (1973); School Comm. of Braintree v. Raymond, Mass.... -,
343 N.E.2d
145, 148 (1976); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 781, 199
N.W.2d 752, 758 (1972); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., N.J. -,
-,
393 A.2d 278, 288 (1978); Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers' Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 774,
358 N.E.2d 878, 879 (1976).
134. Early in the history of public employee collective bargaining legislation, some
courts relied upon similar constitutional provisions as a basis for holding that all public sector
collective bargaining is unlawful because it represents an unconstitutional delegation of au-
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ferred from the public entity to an employee group. Because this
transfer of responsibility is prohibited, the public entity is not required to bargain on public policy issues. Thus, public policy issues
are non-mandatory.'1 For example, the Montana Constitution provides that "supervision and control of schools in each school district
shall be vested in the board of trustees . . . ."I" Under the delegation theory argument, Montana school boards may not delegate
their authority regarding the "supervision and control" of the
schools because the school board is given exclusive control in this
area of decision making.
Regardless of whether the courts construe the collective bargaining legislation or use the delegation theory, there is general
agreement that bargaining issues which have a significant impact
upon the determination of policy are employer prerogatives. Accordingly, employer prerogatives represent the employer managerial interests in policy implementation and the public's interest in policy
'
formulation. 3
thority in violation of the unilateral process mandated by their constitutions. See, e.g.,
Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 329, 71 N.E.2d 246, 254 (1947). In recent years
courts that continue to rely on the delegation theory have retreated from this position and
now hold that collective bargaining represents an unconstitutional delegation of authority
only when policy issues are involved. See note 133, supra.
135. As the New Jersey court has indicated, "surely the legislature in adopting the
[public employment bargaining act] did not contemplate that the local boards of education
would or could abdicate their management responsibilities for local education policies or that
the state educational authorities would or could abdicate their management responsibilities
for the state educational policies." Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Bd. of Educ. Ass'n, 64
N.J. 17, 25, 311 A.2d 737, 741 (1973).
136. MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 8.
137. The unlawful delegation concept is most often used to refer to a legislative grant
of rulemaking authority to administrative agencies, see, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1937); the executive branch, see, e.g., Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); or private groups, see, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936). The federal courts have in recent years appeared to abandon the delegation
doctrine, at least in the first two categories in which state courts continue to rely on the
doctrine. See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT [hereinafter cited as DAVIS] § 26-52 (3d
ed. 1972). See also Bacus v. Lake County, 138 Mont. 69, 81, 354 P.2d 1056, 1062 (1960); Huber
v. Groff, 171 Mont. 442, 458, 558 P.2d 1124, 1133 (1976).
Courts have used the doctrine to prohibit legislative delegation of rule-making authority
where the legislature has failed to establish standards for guidance in the exercise of the
rulemaking authority. DAvIs at § 31; Bacus, 138 Mont. at 81,354 P.2d at 1062. However, when
the delegation doctrine is applied to public sector collective bargaining, courts frequently do
not look for guidelines, but emphasize the hierarchy of delegated authority from the people
to the constitution to the legislature to the individual public employer. See note 133, supra.
The fact that the delegation doctrine as applied to the collective bargaining process, emphasizes the hierarchy of authority rather than legislative guidelines has resulted in criticism
regarding the applicability of the doctrine. See Four Approaches, supra note 7, at 451-59.
The critics, however, fail to recognize that the delegation doctrine is merely an alternative method of emphasizing that the public employer, as opposed to its private sector counterpart, is directed to act in the public interest and that it cannot exclude the public from the
decisions regarding public policy.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol40/iss2/2
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5.

The Balancing Process in Summary

When the bargaining topic involves the interest of the employees in wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment, and the public employer's managerial interests in policy implementation (or the public's interest in policy formulation), the
decision maker must evaluate and weigh these conflicting interests
to determine whether the subject is mandatory or non-mandatory.
The weight of the public interest, together with any separate management interest of the public employer, must be balanced against
the interest of the employees to determine whether the topic is
mandatory or non-mandatory.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING FORMULA TO PRIMARY
AND SECONDARY EDUCATION COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Given this analytical approach, the next step is to evaluate its
application to actual collective bargaining subjects. This analysis
will focus on scope-of-bargaining questions that occur in primary
and secondary education. However, as previously noted, the analytical approach is applicable to all public sector bargaining.
A.

Mandatory and Non-Mandatory Subjects of Collective
Bargaining

Despite the fact that the majority of courts use the balancing
test to determine the mandatory or non-mandatory status of bargaining topics that have an impact upon conditions of employment
and employer prerogatives, the decisions are hardly uniform. Apart
from their legislative differences, the courts' decisions have been
more conclusional than analytical. In those instances where judicial
analysis exists, the analysis frequently is so superficial that it is
impossible to discern any guidelines which may be applied with
certainty in any future cases. Often it appears that the decisions
coming from PERBs are nothing more than a series of conclusions.
However, if balancing is prefaced with full recognition, identification, and consideration of employee interests in wages, hours, fringe
benefits and other conditions of employment, employer interests in
the operation and management of the public enterprise and the
interest of the public in the determination of policy, the balancing
process will result in fair and analytical decisions which will provide
much needed guidelines.
1.

Classroom Size

A topic that has given PERBs and courts a great deal of difficulty is the subject of classroom size, or the maximum number of
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1979
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students a teacher must instruct in a given class. Teacher bargaining proposals on class size are generally one of two types: (1) the
teachers demand salary increases in excess of those established in
the salary scale for each additional student in excess of a bargained
classroom size; or (2) the teachers demand a certain maximum
classroom size, and if student enrollment increases beyond that
agreed maximum, the school board is required to create an additional class and hire additional faculty. The first class size proposal
is a mandatory subject. The topic is primarily an economic subject
related to the rate of pay teachers are to receive. When the number
of students in a classroom exceeds a certain established number, the
teacher receives an increased rate of pay. As the number of students
a teacher is called upon to instruct increases, the greater the teacher
workload. If salaries are to reflect workloads, at least in part, and
workloads increase, salaries should increase. Because the topic
clearly relates to the mandatory subject of "wages" and does not
raise any non-economic policy issues, balancing of interests is unnecessary and the topic is considered mandatory.
The second class size proposal requires the balancing of interests. The negotiating teachers do not seek increased economic benefits in the event of class size increases. Rather, they seek to compel
the school board to create an additional class and hire more teachers. Although the courts that have considered this issue are split, a
majority holds the topic to be non-mandatory.' 38 The minority of
courts has concluded that class size is directly related to the amount
of work expected for a given rate of pay and thus is a condition of
employment and a mandatory topic. As one court observed, the
number of students affects the teacher's control and discipline,
teaching and communication, and the total amount of work required for a fixed salary. "' On the other hand, the majority of courts
maintains that the establishment of a maximum class size is a basic
138. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 752, 512 P.2d 426, 435 (1973);
School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 784, 199 N.W.2d 752, 759
(1972); West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 52, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723,
315 N.E.2d 775, 778 (1974); Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v, Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 88 S.D. 127,
133, 215 N.W.2d 837, 841 (1974). Contra, Clark County School Dist. v. Local Gov't Employee
Management Rel. Bd., 90 Nev. 442, 448, 530 P.2d 114, 118-19 (1974) (the Nevada statute since
has been changed and the topic now would be non-mandatory; see note 44, supra); West
Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 586, 295 A.2d 526, 537 (1972). The following cases have held the topic to be permissive: Boston Teachers' Union v. School Comm. of
Boston, 370 Mass. 455, 462, 350 N.E.2d 707, 714 (1976); Bd. of Educ. v. Greenburgh Teachers'
Federation, 51 App. Div. 2d 1039, 381 N.Y.S.2d 517, 518 (1976); City of Beloit v. Wis.
Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 64, 242 N.W.2d 231, 241 (1976). For a discussion
of permissive bargaining topics, see text accompanying notes 156-64, infra.
139. Clark County School Dist. v. Local Gov't Employee Management Rel. Bd., 90 Nev.
442, 448, 530 P.2d 114, 118-19 (1974).
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element of educational policy bearing on the quality and quantity
of education rendered to the community and is thus an employer
prerogative. 40
This bargaining topic illustrates well the conflict between the
statutory duty to bargain concerning wages, hours, fringe benefits
and other conditions of employment, and employer prerogatives.
The topic fits nicely within either category.' Unquestionably, the
topic of maximum class size affects employee interests in the mandatory subjects of bargaining "wages, hours, fringe benefits and
other conditions of employment." The more students with whom a
teacher must work, the greater the teacher workload; that is, the
amount of work for a given wage. If it can be argued that a bargaining topic which mandates increased faculty salaries whenever class
size exceeds established amounts is an economic issue and mandatory, then a topic that requires the school board to expend money
for additional faculty if the maximum class size is exceeded is also
solely economic, and thus mandatory. To state it another way, if
paying existing faculty more money under certain circumstances is
economic, then hiring additional faculty under the same circumstances is also economic (it requires an expenditure of funds on
additional faculty rather than the additional expenditure of funds
on existing faculty) and mandatory.
The Montana Act, however, specifically recognizes that the
authority to "hire" is an employer prerogative.'
Moreover, other
state courts have recognized that the authority to hire is an em43
ployer prerogative, even in the absence of such specific legislation.
Even so, the mere fact that a topic touches upon an employer prerogative does not necessarily remove it from mandatory negotiation.
The decision maker must first define the extent of the impact upon
the employer's prerogatives and then balance the impact against
the employee interest in the subject.
The teachers will acknowledge that the proposal requires the
employer to "hire" additional faculy if the maximum class size is
exceeded, but they will argue that any proposal which results in a
reduced teacher workload would have the same effect, and work
reduction proposals are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Manda140. See, e.g., West Irondequoit Teachers' Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 52, 358
N.Y.S.2d 720, 723, 315 N.E.2d 775, 778 (1974).
141. The Wisconsin court recognized this in relation to class size in City of Beloit v.
Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 45, 242 N.W.2d 231, 235 (1976).
142. MCA § 39-31-303(2) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(b) (Supp.
1977)).
143. School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 784,
199 N.W.2d 752, 759 (1972); Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 26,
311 A.2d 737, 741 (1973).
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tory employee workload topics affect the employer's hiring decisions
and the mandatory class size topic does not impose any greater
impact on hiring and therefore it should be accorded similar mandatory status.
The school board will argue that the class size proposal, unlike
general work reduction proposals, mandates hiring additional faculty whenever class size exceeds a certain maximum. Accordingly,
the class size proposal removes two major incidents of hiring from
the employer: "Whether to" and "when to" hire, whereas most
work reduction proposals leave these crucial decisions to the employers. Under a typical work reduction proposal, the employer is
free to reduce the services offered, but it hardly can say to a group
of fourth grade students that they may not attend school because
an additional teacher will not be hired to handle the excess of the
maximum class size. Thus, from the employer's perspective, while
all work reduction proposals generally have an impact on hiring, the
class size proposal "directly" affects and "significantly" removes
the critical incidents of the hiring decision from the employer.
The teachers would then assert that the removal of the school
board's unilateral discretion "whether to" and "when to" hire in
this limited area is not a significant inroad on managerial prerogatives. Rather, the ultimate issue of hiring is based on a contingency
that may never occur-increased enrollment. Moreover, the teachers will argue that because of their professional standing and concern for quality education, they are in a particularly strong position
to speak on the issue of class size. This argument raises the second
component of employer prerogatives, the issue of policy formulation.
Admittedly, teachers have a great deal of expertise and a strong
professional interest on this issue of educational policy.' The ques144. It has been recognized that a public employer must recognize the professional
concerns of professional employees. See Clark County School Dist. v. Local Gov't Employee
Management Rel. Bd., 90 Nev. 442, 445, 530 P.2d 114, 116 (1974); Fargo Ed. Ass'n v. Paulsen,
239 N.W.2d 842, 848 (N.D. 1976). See also Four Approaches, supra note 7, at 472. For
example, "Teacher organizations have been leaders in organized labor's fight to open up the
range of bargainable issues to include almost every conceivable item that would even remotely affect their terms and conditions of employment." Metzler, The Need for Limitation
upon the Scope of Negotiations in Public Education, 2 J. L. & EDUC. 137, 145 (1973). This
drive to open the range of bargainable issues has frequently resulted in demands to bargain
on matters of fundamental school policy. One author has indicated that the reason for this is
because: (1) teachers are all professionals with an interest and expertise about many policy
decisions; and (2) many policy decisions which would have no effect on terms and conditions
of employment of many non-professional workers do have an effect on the working conditions
of teachers.
Alleyne, supra note 13, at 112. Additionally, where professional employers recognize that
their monetary demands will go unanswered, they turn to policy issue negotiation. See Note,
Collective Bargaining and the ProfessionalEmployee, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 291-92 (1969).
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tion, however, is whether educational policy should be considered
in the bilateral collective bargaining forum, or in the broader multilateral forum which includes all interest groups.' The public interest in this policy determination looms large. Parents will be extremely concerned about the maximum number of students in a
classroom. The establishment of a maximum class size will have a
significant impact on quality education, an issue which will be of
community interest.
In addition to the quality of education, the public will be concerned with the potential monetary cost of establishing maximum
class sizes. As previously indicated, when the bargaining topic raises
only an economic issue, courts have held that the bilateral collective
bargaining process is a sufficient forum in which to decide the issue.
The public has an opportunity to participate in financial decisions
at the multilateral budget sessions. But where a bargaining topic
commits a public entity to an undetermined financial expenditure
involving major potential capital improvements, public consideration of the ramifications must precede contractual commitment." 8
Unless the school has excess fiscal capacity, additional classrooms
must be made available to accommodate the additional classes.
This will involve large capital expenditures for building, fixtures,
and equipment. Even if the present facility can accommodate the
145. Thus, the fact that the public employees may have a professional interest in an
issue involving fundamental school policy does not mean that the topic becomes a mandatory
subject of bargaining. As the New Jersey court has recognized:
The holding that the [issue] was predominately a matter of educational policy
not mandatorily negotiable does not indicate that the school board would not have
been well advised to have voluntarily discussed it in a timely fashion with the
representatives of the teachers. Peaceful relations between school administration
and its teachers is an ever present goal and though the teachers may not be permitted to take over the educational policies entrusted. . . to the Board they as trained
professionals may have much to contribute towards the Board's adoption of sound
and suitable educational policies.
Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 31-32, 311 A.2d 737, 744-45 (1973).
Employee professional interest together with the interests and ideas of parents, other
public groups and individuals and non-employee professionals should all be considered in the
formulation of fundamental school policy. This, of course, is the role of a multilateral
decision-making forum.
Some state legislation has specifically recognized the need for public employee participation in certain policy issues. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Purdon Supp. 1978)
(policy matters affecting wages, hours, and conditions of employment). See also Comment,
Determining the Scope of Bargaining under the Indiana Education Employment Rel. Act,
49 IND. L.J. 460 (1974), for an analysis of the Indiana law in this regard.
146. "[I]f a demand for lowered classroom size were to require the construction of a
new school building for the reduced-in-size classes, relatedness to management and direction
of the school system is obvious. Would such required result of a new building not be a matter
on which groups involved, beyond school board and teachers' association, are entitled to have
their say and input?" City of Beloit v. Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 53,
242 N.W.2d 231, 235-36 (1976).
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additional classes, they undoubtedly cannot be added without
changing the class schedule, extending the school day, or implementing a double shift. To this extent, a bargaining proposal establishing maximum class size involes questions of educational policy
formulation in which the public has a significant interest.
After identifying the competing employee, employer, and public interests, it is the decision maker's responsibility to balance
these competing interests and determine the mandatory or nonmandatory status of the topic. The interest of the teachers, both in
terms of workload and professional standing'4 7 in the establishment
of a maximum class size, must be balanced against the public manager's loss of two major incidents in its prerogative to "hire," together with the public's interest in the formulation of educational
policy. From the scenario presented, it appears that the majority of
the courts have correctly found the topic of mandatory class size to
be non-mandatory. The employer's interests and the public's interest outweigh the teachers' interest.
2.

Curricula

Bargaining proposals designed to provide for greater teacher
involvement in determining school curricula have received much
judicial attention. Despite varying approaches, the courts have generally held that the content of school curricula is a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining. 48 The proposed balancing formula will most
often confer the same result, but the balancing formula offers a
context that recognizes the legitimate competing interests involved and provides an appropriate method for adequately evaluating particular proposals. Thus, the court would escape the conclusionary pitfall of determining that every proposal with any remote
impact upon curricula was non-mandatory.
Suppose the teachers seek to bargain on a proposal that places
curriculum decisions in the hands of a committee consisting of an
equal number of school board members and teachers. The topic of
school curricula does not relate to "wages, hours, or fringe benefits,"
and thus is not economic. The issue, however, does involve two
legitimate teacher bargaining interests: the type of work the teachers are expected to perform and their professional interest in curric147. See notes 144 and 145, supra.
148. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 586, 295 A.2d 526, 537
(1972); Nat'l Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 752, 512 P.2d 426, 434 (1973); School
Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 784, 199 N.W.2d 752,
759 (1972); Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 88 S.D. 127, 133, 215 N.W.2d
837, 841 (1974); Joint School Dist. v. Wis. Employment Rel. Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 493, 155
N.W.2d 78, 82-83 (1967).
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ulum development. Therefore, it falls within "other conditions of
employment." But before the bargaining status of the topic can be
determined, the legitimate teacher interest must be balanced
against any interest of the employer-public.
The formulation of public school curricula clearly involves an
issue of educational policy. Determining what is to be taught in a
public school goes to the heart of educational policy formulation.
Most assuredly, the public will be concerned with this subject and
will desire to make its views known. The collective bargaining forum
limits the participants to the teachers and the school board; it precludes public participation.
Before actually weighing the competing interests of teachers
and the public in this subject, it must also be determined whether
the curricula issue infringes upon any managerial interest of the
public employer regarding the operation, management, or implementation of school policy. Unlike the issue of maximum class size,
the Montana Act does not specifically provide that curriculum issues are employer prerogatives.'49
Indeed, it is difficult to see how the determination of curricula
has an impact upon any of the specified employer prerogatives.
Moreover, even though the Montana Act does not limit the employer prerogatives to those specified, it is hard to imagine how the
curriculum decisions affect school operation, management, or policy
implementation. Rather, the issue appears to be one of policy formulation. The bargaining status of the issue depends solely upon
whether the teachers' interest in this subject is sufficient to require
that the issue be considered in a collective bargaining forum.
While the general conclusion is that issues of curriculum are
non-mandatory subjects of bargaining, the use of the balancing formula recognizes the legitimate interest of the parties concerned, and
it requires open consideration of the conflicting interests. Moreover,
the balancing formula quickly reveals that not every potential topic
involving teacher participation in the formulation of curriculum
decisions will be non-mandatory. For example, if the teachers' bargaining proposal sought to have school curriculum decisions made
in an open forum by representatives of the teachers, school board,
and public, the subject would be considered mandatory. Under this
proposal, public participation is built into the decision-making process, thus fulfilling the public interest requirement. The balancing
formula recognizes that not all bargaining topics which have been
declared non-mandatory will in fact be determined non-mandatory
149. MCA § 39-31-303 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(2) (Supp.
1977)) (text accompanies note 26, supra).
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where the interest of the teachers outweighs the interest of the
employer-public. In the final analysis, the balancing formula provides great assistance in resolving whether a specific topic is mandatory or non-mandatory; it also provides assistance to the bargaining
parties in designing appropriate bargaining subjects and evaluating
the mandatory or non-mandatory nature of a given bargaining proposal. The beauty of the balancing formula lies in its simplicity and
flexibility.
3.

"Impact" Bargaining

While the balance of the competing interests may be in favor
of treating a given topic as non-mandatory, that determination does
not necessarily preclude the topic from being mandatory. In other
words, while the topic may be considered non-mandatory, the impact of the topic on the employees may require mandatory bargaining. Some courts that have determined maximum classroom size10
or curriculum decisions'51 to be non-mandatory topics also have held
that the "impact" of increased enrollment or curriculum decisions
on teachers requires mandatory bargaining. Thus, school boards
must bargain on an array of topics dealing with the impact of increased enrollments on teachers, including increasing teachers' salaries and benefits. Similarly, courts have held that to the extent
school board decisions change existing curricula, programs, and extracurricular activities, and to the extent those changes affect
teacher interests in wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment, the impact of the change on the teachers is a
mandatory subject of bargaining.152
For example, while the decision concerning the existence and
scope of extracurricular activities has been held a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining, the school board cannot assign teachers to
supervise these extracurricular activities or establish the rate of
compensation for such teacher supervision without first negotiating
with the teachers. The assignment of additional duties and the determination of compensation are within the mandatory subjects.,53
150. West Lrondequoit Teachers' Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 52, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720,
723, 315 N.E.2d 775, 778 (1974); City of Beloit v. Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis.
2d 43, 64, 242 N.W.2d 231, 241 (1976).
151. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 581, 295 A.2d 526, 535
(1972); Bd. of Educ. v. Asbury Park Educ. Ass'n, 145 N.J. Super. 495, 507-08, 368 A.2d 396,
402-03,(1976); City of Beloit v. Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 64, 242 N.W.2d
231, 241 (1976).
152. See note 151, supra.
153. As the Connecticut court stated:
There can be no doubt that the defendant board of education alone is empowered to determine whether there shall be extracurricular activities and what such
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The result in Montana is somewhat complicated by the fact
that the Montana Act specifically provides that the authority to
"transfer" or "assign" employees is an employer prerogative.' '4
However, while the school board may "transfer" or "assign" teachers to additional duties, it will be required to bargain regarding the
impact that the assignment or transfer has on mandatory subjects
of bargaining. To state it another way, if the assignment to supervise the extracurricular activities results in an additional work burden, the board is required to bargain on those issues coming within
wages, hours, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment."'
B.

Permissive Subjects of Collective Bargaining

If a subject is non-mandatory and the school board thus is not
required to bargain on the subjebt, may it agree to so bargain? This
issue often arises when the board agrees to bargain on a nonmandatory subject, reaches agreement, and includes the agreement
in the final collective bargaining agreement. Subsequently, the
teachers attempt to enforce the contract provision regarding the
subject, and the school board argues that the subject not only was
non-mandatory, but also non-permissive, making the contract provision void.' 6
The school board maintains that if the "public interest" regarding a non-economic policy issue is sufficient to mandate multilateral
consideration, the issue is non-mandatory, and also non-permissive.
If the policy topic requires multilateral consideration, the public
employer may not repudiate the public's interest and address the
issue in a bilateral collective bargaining setting. The public's interest in the subject is separate and distinct from the employermanager's interest. Thus, while the employer may voluntarily waive
activities shall be . . . . The assignment of teachers to such activities and the
question of compensation for such extracurricular activities affect salaries and other
conditions of employment . . . are to that extent only, mandatory subjects of
negotiation.
West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 586-87, 295 A.2d 526, 537 (1972).
154. MCA § 39-31-303(2) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1603(b) (Supp.
1977)).
155. Moreover, to the extent that the assignment will be directed at only certain teachers, the board may be required to bargain regarding the method used to determine who will
be assigned the additional work. Thus, even though the Act specifies that the authority to
"assign" is an employer prerogative, it does not necessarily mean every decision concerning
"assignments" will be non-mandatory. See notes 150 and 151, supra and text accompanying
notes 150-53, supra.
156. Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n, 64 N.J. 17, 31, 311 A.2d 737, 744
(1973). See also Boston Teachers Union, Local 66 v. School Comm. of Boston, - Mass.
,, 350 N.E.2d 707, 714 (1976); Bd. of Educ. v. Greenburgh Teachers Federation, 51
App. Div. 2d 1039, 381 N.Y.S.2d 517, 518 (1976).
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its interest in the subject, it cannot waive the interest of the public,
and any agreement that purports to do so is void. Enforcement of
the agreement would undermine the recognized need for multilateral consideration of the issue' 57 and would waive the public's legitimate interest in the subject.5 8
The potential for the public employer to unilaterally disregard
the public interest and bargain with the employee representative
has led many to conclude that there are no permissive subjects of
bargaining in public employment.' 59 Either the subject is mandatory
or it is prohibited. This approach is unnecessarily narrow, for it is
possible to protect the legitimate public interest and yet authorize
a range of permissive subjects of bargaining.
Permissive subjects arise in two situations. The first occurs
when the employer waives its interest in the bargaining subject, and
as a result, the subject loses its non-mandatory status. Prior to the
waiver, the topic is non-mandatory because the weight of the employer interest together with any separate "public" interest is
greater than the interest of the employees. But when the managerial
interest is waived, the employee interests weigh more than any separate "public" interest and the topic becomes open for bargaining.
Suppose the teachers seek a contract provision that no teacher
with more than five years of seniority will be assigned "hall duty."
The school board realizes the Montana Act specifically provides
that the authority to "assign" employees is an employer prerogative, but rather than argue, the board consents to bargain on the
subject and agreement is reached.' 0 There is little or no "public
interest" in the subject, and when the employer waives its interest
the subject becomes open for bargaining. "'
157. See Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., - N.J.
___
393 A.2d
278, 287 (1978).
158. Disregard of public interest becomes extremely critical when the positions of the
public employer and public employee are similar. See text accompanying notes 122 and 123,
supra.
159. Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., N.J ....
393 A.2d 278,
287 (1978). See Summers, supra note 106, at 1193-94; Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for
Bargainingin Local Government Labor Relations, 30 MD. L. REV. 179, 189 (1970); Sackman,
supra note 13, at 189-94.
160. See note 155, supra.
161. There are, of course, subjects which are non-mandatory and non-permissive. An
example of this type of subject is a bargaining issue which directly affects the content of
school curriculum, such as the creation of special programs or the establishment of extracurricular activities. As previously noted, courts have generally held that curriculum decisions,
as opposed to the manner in which those decisions are reached, are non-mandatory subjects
of bargaining. See note 148, supra. However, assume that the school board voluntarily agrees
to bargain on the determination of curriculum decisions, agreement is reached, and the
agreement is included in the final collective bargaining agreement. Thereafter, the school
board refuses to follow the contract provision and alleges that the topic is non-mandatory and
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The second situation involving a permissive subject arises
where the bargaining topic could never reach mandatory status because the topic in the first instance does not represent a subject in
which the employees have a significant interest in "wages, hours,
fringe benefits, or other conditions of employment." But if there is
no adverse "public" interest in the topic and the public employermanager chooses to bargain on the subject, the subject becomes
open for bargaining. Suppose, for example, public school classrooms
are to be painted. The teachers want the classrooms painted a color
other than presently planned. It is difficult to conclude that this
raises a significant issue relating to "wages, hours, fringe benefits,
or other conditions of employment."'' 2 Accordingly, the topic could
never be mandatory. But suppose the employer-manager agrees to
the employee bargaining proposal. There clearly is no weighty public interest in the subject, and since the employer has elected to
waive his interest in the subject, the subject is permissive, and any
agreement reached should be given validity.
In either situation, the decision of the employer to waive its
interest in the subject and bargain does not adversely affect any
fundamental public interest which would necessitate multilateral
consideration. Either the employees' legitimate interest in the mandatory subjects of bargaining outweighs the public policy interest,
or despite the fact the subject does not raise a legitimate interest in
a mandatory subject category, there is no public policy interest in
the subject.
However, the Montana Act specifically prohibits school boards
from engaging in the second category of permissive bargaining. The
Act prohibits school boards, as opposed to all other public employees, from bargaining "upon any matter other than [wages, hours,
fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment]."' 63 Thus, a
Montana school board may enter permissive negotiations only
where the bargaining topic involves a subject in which the employees have a significant interest in "wages, hours, fringe benefits, or
non-permissive. This topic is considered non-mandatory, not because of a strong school board
interest in the operation and management of the school, but rather because of a strong public
interest in multilateral consideration of school curriculum and program decisions. An effort
by the school board to waive its managerial interest in this topic and confine the decision to
a bilateral decision-making process will not effectively waive the public interest, and insofar
as the public interest outweighs the teacher interest, the topic is non-permissive and the
contract provision is void.
162. It could be argued that the color of the work place affects the employee-employer
relationship because the work place color has an impact upon the psyche of the employees,
thereby affecting their performance, and thus is a condition of employment. The potential
for such an argument is somewhat lessened by limiting mandatory topics to "significant"
issues relating to "wages, hours, fringe benefits or other conditions of employment."
163. MCA § 39-31-304(1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1617 (Supp.
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other conditions of employment," and the public interest standing
alone will not outweigh the employee interest.
It could be argued that even when the topic involves one of
those items, there is insufficient adverse "public" interest in the
topic, the public employer may not waive its managerial interest
and engage in permissive negotiations if the employer's interest is
derived from the Montana Act. The question is whether the public
employer can waive a managerial prerogative recognized by the legislature. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intent that subjects
included in the statutory employer prerogatives clause, which only
affect the managerial interest of the public employer, were intended
to be non-permissive as well as non-mandatory, this conclusion
should not be drawn.
As previously noted, public employment involves two inherent
limitations on the scope of bargaining. First, the inherent interest
of the employer in operating and managing the enterprise, and second, the inherent interest of the public in ensuring that the public
enterprise is operating in conformity with the public interest. The
interest of the employer and the interest of the public are jointly
recognized as employer prerogatives. Where the public employer
voluntarily waives its interest on a subject involving the operation
and management of the enterprise, that management determination should be controlling. The public manager is in the best position to evaluate its particular interests during contract negotiations.
Thus, when the public manager determines that a concession on a
given subject will enhance its overall bargaining position and the
ability to operate the public enterprise, the decision should be given
effect, even the legislature has determined there is a managerial
interest. Only when the public manager attempts to waive the independent interest of the public and bargains on an issue of significant
public interest which outweighs any employee interest should the
topic be determined non-permissive.
V.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A.
1.

Statutory Preemption

In General

Regardless of how one balances the interest of the employees,
public manager, and public, an additional consideration greatly
affects the bargaining status of a given topic. This occurs when the
bargaining topic, either mandatory or permissive, conflicts with a
legislative standard established apart from the state public emhttps://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol40/iss2/2
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ployee collective bargaining statute.' 4 This potential conflict between the legislative bargaining obligation under the collective bargaining statute and other separate legislation is referred to as
"statutory preemption."' 65 Most often, public employee bargaining
legislation authorizes collective barganing in an area where the legislature has by statute previously determined the point of accommodation on many potential collective bargaining subjects. The issue
becomes how to accommodate the legislative bargaining mandate
with existing legislative pronouncements.
This potential for conflict is significant when the legislature has
enacted a considerable body of legislation regarding the rights and
responsibilities of public employees and employers, as well as protective procedures for these legislative mandates, and has failed to
reconcile these previous enactments with the newer collective bargaining legislation. Both the prior enactments and the collective
bargaining legislation are designed to accomplish the same goal.
However, the prior legislation created public employee-employer
rights and duties through legislation, while the collective bargaining
legislation envisions the establishment of rights and duties through
the collective bargaining process. Some public employee collective
bargaining acts have specifically spoken to this problem.'66 Without
specific legislative direction, courts have been compelled to address
this conflict on a case-by-case basis.6 7 Montana's act does not address the problem; therefore, consideration of the topic is in order.
164. The standard in conflict could be an administrative rule (either a prescriptive
(legislative) rule, one issued pursuant to an express power to resolve doubtful cases under a
general statutory standard or to render operative a statutory provision that is not selfexecuting, or an interpretive rule, one issued in the absence of a grant of authority to make
law). See DAVIS, supra note 137, at § 5.06; Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication
in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 958-60 (1965).
165. "[T]he obligation to bargain as to all terms and conditions of employment is a
broad and unqualified one and there is no reason why the mandatory provision of that act
should be limited, in any way, except in cases where some other applicable statutory provision
explicitly and definitively prohibits the public employer from making an agreement as to a
particular term or condition of employment." Bd. of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 35 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 282 N.E.2d 109, 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23, (1972).
166. Of those states that have spoken on this problem, some have resolved the conflict
by providing that the collectively bargained agreement shall prevail. See, e.g., HAW. REV.
STAT. § 89-19 (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 150E, § 7(d) (West Supp. 1976); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154C-1, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1976). Other states allow the general
statutory provision to prevail. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1101, 703 (Purdon Supp.
1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1725(c) (Supp. 1977).
167. Even in those states where the legislature has indicated that the conflict is to be
resolved favoring the collective bargaining agreement or the general statutory provision,
courts have had difficulty and proceed on a case-by-case basis. See Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v.
State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337 A.2d 262, 270 (1975).
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In Montana

Judicial resolution of this conflict which gives priority to preexisting legislation significantly restricts the scope of collective bargaining. A determination that deems preempted every bargaining
topic that involves a subject which the legislature has addressed
exempts many potential bargaining subjects from consideration. On
the other hand, a determination that gives priority to the bargaining
obligation over conflicting legislation could potentially undermine
a significant body of legislation designed to protect the public, the
public employees, and the public employer.
Such a judicial resolution clearly is inappropriate. But where a
bargaining topic "directly" conflicts with the statute, the topic is
preempted from bargaining. 8 To determine whether there is a direct conflict, the PERB or court must closely evaluate the breadth
of both the statutory provision and the bargaining topic (or contract
provision). Only when the bargaining topic "directly" infringes
upon the statute is the topic preempted.'69
A good example of this conflict arises when teachers seek to
include "the school calendar"'' ° and "student discipline""' topics as
part of their collective bargaining agreement. The Montana legislature has: (1) prescribed that any school district that does not provide at least 180 school days of instruction shall not be entitled to
any apportionment of the state funds;' (2) prescribed the numbers
of hours in every school day' (and the number of hours in a teacher
168. The public employer is precluded from agreeing to a specific proposal only when
"other applicable statutory provisions explicitly and definitely prohibit the public employer
[from doing so]." Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337
A.2d 262, 270 (1975). See also Newman v. Bd. of Educ., 350 A.2d 339, 341 (Del. 1975).
The New York court has held that a public employer's duty to bargain over an otherwise
mandatory subject is limited by plain and clear, as well as express, prohibitions in statutory
or decisional law. Syracuse Teachers Ass'n v. Bd.of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 743, 743, 361 N.Y.S.2d
912, 912, 320 N.E.2d 646, 646 (1974); Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 38 N.Y.2d 137, 144,
341 N.E.2d 532, 535, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 (1975).
169. See note 168, supra.
170. Because the establishment of the school calendar determines the length of the work
year and the amount and frequency of time off during the term, the subject affects employee
hours, fringe benefits or other conditions of employment. For the various court treatments of
this subject, exclusive of the statutory preemptive problem, see Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 242, 30609 (1978).
171. A Montana Education Association report finds that approximately one-third of
Montana teachers responding to an MEA survey were victims of verbal abuse, physical
assault, or suffered property damage in connection with their school assignments. MEA
predicted strong discipline policies will become major issues in teacher contract negotiations
this year. Missoulian, Sept. 14, 1978, at 14.
For judicial treatment of this topic, see City of Beloit v. Wis. Employment Rel. Comm'n,
73 Wis. 2d 43, 61, 242 N.W.2d 231, 239 (1976).
172. MCA § 20-1-301 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 75-7402).
173. MCA § 20-1-302 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 75-7403).
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work day'); and (3) provided certain school holidays.' While bargaining topics cannot specifically deviate from a mandatory statutory provision or a prohibition, they could be considered during
negotiations insofar as they don't "directly" conflict with these statutory provisions.' For example, the statute does not mandate 180
days of school; rather it conditionspayment of the state's share of
expenses on holding school for at least that number of days.'77
Therefore, negotiation on the number of days in the school year
78
would not be preempted.
Similarly, the specific statute for student discipline provides
that a teacher or principal may hold a student accountable for disorderly conduct and, under specified circumstances and following certain procedures, may inflict corporal punishment and suspend the
student. The statute also provides that a teacher or principal who
shall abuse a student by administering any undue or severe punishment shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 79 Thus, a bargaining topic
which provides the circumstances under which a teacher may discipline students and the appropriate method of discipline would not
be preempted by the statute as long as the provision did not directly
conflict with the statute.'80 Additionally, a topic requiring the school
board to pay the legal fees of a teacher who is subject to either civil
or criminal litigation resulting from a disciplinary proceeding would
not be preempted. The payment of legal fees for the teacher charged
with violating a state statute does not directly conflict with the
174. MCA § 39-4-107 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1121 (Supp. 1977)).
175. MCA § 20-1-308 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 75-7403.1(4) (Supp.
1977)).
176. As the Oregon court stated, "True the local board cannot agree to adopt rules, but
we see no reason why this prevents it from bargaining as to the content of its rules so long as
the rules eventually promulgated are consistent with statewide rules." Sutherlin Educ. Ass'n
v. Sutherlin School Dist., 25 Or. App. 85, 548 P.2d 204, 205 (1976).
177. It has been recognized as a general method of statutory construction that when two
provisions conflict, the provisions of a special act will prevail over the provisions of a general
act. City of Billings v. Smith, 158 Mont. 197, 211, 490 P.2d 221,230 (1971). Accordingly, when
the provisions of the special act, (such as one dealing specifically with the authority of school
districts) "directly" conflicts with the provisions of a collectively bargained agreement, authorized under the general collective bargaining legislation, the provisions of the special act
have priority. See Pa. Labor Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 337
A.2d 262, 269 (1975). See also Zderick v. Silver Bow County, 154 Mont. 118, 121, 460 P.2d
749, 751 (1969) in which it was held, before the passage of the collective bargaining act, that
the county had no authority to enter into an agreement with employees granting accumulated
sick leave pay upon retirement because retirement benefits were fixed by statute.
178. This of course does not mean that a topic not preempted is a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining. The determination that a topic is not preempted by other legislation does not affect or give guidance to the determination of whether the topic is mandatory,
non-mandatory and permissive, or non-mandatory and non-permissive. See section IV, supra.
179. MCA § 20-4-302 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 75-6109).
180. However, the imposition of punishment must comply with the requirements of due
process. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
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intent of the statute. A provision of the payment of legal fees is
merely an indirect form of employee compensation, similar to
health insurance. It does not adversely affect the public's right to
enforcement of state criminal laws. Unless some other statute, rule,
regulation, or public policy can be found that "directly" prohibits
the payment of legal fees of public employees, the contract provision
should not be preempted.
B. Arbitration
Arbitration has been particularly difficult for PERBs and
courts. One problem comes from the argument that collectively bargained arbitration clauses which authorize a third party arbitrator
to make a decision in an area which the legislature has authorized
the public employer to determine is an unlawful delegation of g6vernmental authority.
There are two types of arbitration provisions: "grievance arbitration" and "interest arbitation."' l Most collective bargaining
agreements have a grievance procedure providing the method for
resolving contract disputes. An employee may raise an issue regarding the proper interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
and the issue will be resolved under the contractual grievance procedure. Often the grievance procedure will provide a multi-step resolution process. The initial steps often involve a series of appeals to
management officials, and, frequently, the final step involves the
submission of any resolved grievance to arbitration." 2
Interest arbitration arises when the parties agree to submit to
arbitration either an existing or future dispute regarding the provisions to be included in a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator is called upon to decide the controversy by including or excluding the disputed contract provision or molding an appropriate
provision. The arbitrator in effect settles the dispute by writing the
disputed portion of the contract."3 Because the courts treat grievance arbitration differently than interest arbitration, the subjects
will be discussed separately. I"4
181. See generally SMITH, MERRIFIELD, AND ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 761-69 (5th ed. 1974), citing Labor Study Group, The Public Interest in
National Labor Policy 32 (Committee for Economic Development 1961).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 624, 526 P.2d
971, 981, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 517 (1974); West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn.
566, 576, 295 A.2d 526, 532 (1972); Local 1226, Rhinelander City Employees v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 220, 151 N.W.2d 30, 36 (1967).
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1. Grievance Arbitration
Absent a legislative prohibition, grievance arbitration represents an unlawful delegation of authority only when the grievance
or contract issue to be resolved involves an issue which would not
be subject to collective bargaining because of its non-mandatory
and non-permissive status.' Those subjects excluded from collective bargaining because they can only be considered in a multilateral forum, or are preempted by other legislation, are certainly not
appropriate for resolution by an arbitrator. If the subject of the
grievance is exempt from collective bargaining, it certainly cannot
be decided unilaterally by an arbitrator. It is inconsistent to prohibit a subject from bilateral bargaining because the subject is legislatively preempted or because multilateral consideration is required, and then allow the same subject to be decided by an arbitrator if it arises as a grievance. If the public interest in a policy subject
is so significant that the bilateral collective bargaining process is an
inappropriate forum for consideration of the subject, or the legislature has preempted the subject from collective bargaining consideration, consideration by an arbitrator would certainly be inappropriate. However, if the grievance involves a subject that would be
classified as either mandatory or permissive during collective bargaining, and the public employer could bargain on the subject, the
public employer could agree to have the subject submitted to arbitration if it arose as a grievance.
2.

Interest Arbitration

Unlike grievance arbitration, in the absence of authorizing legislation, most courts have held that interest arbitration constitutes
an unlawful delegation.5 8 According to the courts' rationale, while
185. "To be arbitralle, a matter must qualify as one on which the parties may negotiate. A matter which is not legally negotiable in the first place cannot be arbitrable." Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., N.J. 393 A.2d 278, 286 (1978).
"Obviously, the [school] board cannot delegate to an arbitrator its statutory authority as to
matters of policy nor can it agree to binding arbitration of matters concerning which a
statutory duty rests on the board alone. If the board sees fit to agree to binding arbitration it
obviously must confine the subjects involved to those matters which are not ultra vires.
Within these limitations binding arbitration of grievances within the terms and conditions
of an existing group teacher contract is a permissive method for settling disputes and is a
mandatory subject of negotiation between the parties." West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 588-89, 295 A.2d 526, 538 (1972). See also Sackman, supra note 13,
at 167.
186. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 589, 295 A.2d 526, 537
(1972); Local 1226, Rhinelander City Employees v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 220,
151 N.W.2d 30, 36 (1967), citing City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387
(Me. 1973). Contra, Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 624,
116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 517, 526 P.2d 971, 981 (1974).
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the legislature has directed the public employer to bargain with the
employee representative, it has also provided that neither party is
required to agree on any specific provisions. Notwithstanding the
legislative policy favoring collective bargaining to agreement, the
legislature has directed the "parties" to reach that accord. The
public employer cannot "abdicate its responsibility for making a
contract" to a third party arbitrator. 187 The public employer's abdication of its responsibility for making a contract to an arbitrator is
treated as an unlawful delegation of authority.
In Montana, the legislature has specifically provided for interest arbitration in public employment collective bargaining.' Despite the fact that the Montana provision may be subject to constitutional attack,', the relevant issue here is whether the parties may
agree to submit every potential contract subject to an arbitrator.
The statute provides that the parties may voluntarily agree "to
submit any or all of the issues to final and binding arbitration
... "10 Clearly, "any or all" refers to only those issues on which
the public employer is authorized to negotiate. Thus, as was the
situation with grievance arbitration, the public employer is precluded from submitting non-mandatory and non-permissive issues
for interest arbitration. It would be unreasonable and inconsistent
to allow a public employer, who is precluded from negotiating an
issue because a multilateral decision-making process is required or
because the issue has been legislatively preempted, to agree to submit the same issue to a third party for determination.
Thus, while agreements authorizing arbitration are valid in
Montana, they cannot be used to raise or resolve subjects which are
beyond the scope of collective bargaining negotiations. An arbitration provision cannot authorize the determination of issues by a
third-party arbitrator which cannot be raised and determined by
the parties themselves.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the almost infinite variety of bargaining proposals, it is
187. West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 589, 295 A.2d 526, 538
(1972).
188. MCA § 39-31-310 (1978) (formerly codifed at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1614(9) (Supp.
1977)).
189. Interest arbitration provisions have been subject to constitutional attack, in some
instances successfully. For a review of the constitutional arguments used and the judicial
outcome see Weisberger, Constitutionalityof Compulsory Public Sector Interest Arbitration
Legislation:A 1976 Perspective, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 35 (ABA Section
of Labor Relations Law 1977).
190. MCA § 39-31-310 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 59-1614(9) (Supp.
1977)) (emphasis added).
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impossible in an abstract to state the parameters of public sector
collective bargaining. For this reason, PERBs and courts have approached this growing area of litigation on a case-by-case basis.
Only when presented with specific topics can an accurate determination be made. When properly understood and applied, the balancing formula provides a fair and accurate method to determine
the appropriate scope of public sector collective bargaining. This is
true, however, only when the decision maker understands and appreciates the role collective bargaining plays in public sector decision making and the legitimate, yet often competing, interests of
public employees, employers, and the public. Balancing assumes
the decision maker understands and appreciates the competing interests involved and the framework in which the decision must operate.
The charge to which the balancing formula is most susceptible
is not the lack of use, but rather its misuse. All too often, PERBs
and courts balance with little regard for how the decision will affect
public sector decision making and without properly identifying the
competing interest involved. In such instances balancing becomes
a thinly veiled method to reach a preconceived decision or adopt a
decision reached in another forum which may have little or no relevance. Decision makers need not alone shoulder the blame for this
misuse of balancing. All too often the "record" in such a case reveals
that counsel failed to bring to the attention of the decision maker
the appropriate interests and indicates the extent, if any, that a
favorable decision would affect public sector decision making. The
failure of counsel to "make a record" has caused decision makers
to balance poorly defined interests, the result of which is often
conclusional decision making.
A goal of this article has been to address the impact collective
bargaining has on public sector decision making and to identify the
often-competing interests employees, employers, and the public
may have regarding a particular bargaining topic, as well as to
indicate how these interests change from topic to topic. To the
extent appropriate interests are identified in relation to a given
topic, the balancing formula will result in fair and accurate decisions. The author hopes the preceding discussion will aid in this
regard.
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